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COMPETING ON QUALITY OF CARE:
THE NEED TO DEVELOP A COMPETITION
POLICY FOR HEALTH CARE MARKETS
William M. Sage*
PeterJ. Hammer**
As American health care moves from a professionally dominated to a market-
dominated model, concerns have been voiced that competition, once unleashed,
will focus on price to the detriment of quality. Although quality has been exten-
sively analyzed in health services research, the role of quality in competition policy
has not been elucidated. While economists may theorize about non-price competi-
tion, courts in antitrust cases often follow simpler models of competition based on
price and output, either ignoring quality as a competitive dimension or assuming
that it will occur in tandem with price competition. This unsystematic approach is
inadequate for the formulation of policy in the health care industry, where quality
is a central concern of both consumers and society. Instead, courts need a frame-
work with which to analyze the implications for quality of various market
structures and to understand the welfare implications of proposed market changes.
A competition policy would seek to evaluate the potential for private markets to
protect and improve quality in the health care system. This Article describes the
present role of antitrust law in medical markets, explores the issues that would be
confronted in developing a competition policy and outlines a research agenda that
would begin to accomplish that task.
INTRODUCTION
As American health care moves from a professionally dominated
to a market-dominated model, there is concern that competition,
once unleashed, will focus on price to the detriment of quality. Al-
though quality has been analyzed extensively in health services
research, the role of quality in regulatory oversight of health care
competition has not been elucidated. There is no consistent, well
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thought-out competition policy guiding private, state, and federal
conduct as it affects health care quality. A competition policy
would seek first to understand what is meant by quality as a poten-
tial benefit of competition in health care, and then to determine
how best to structure oversight of the competitive marketplace so
as to advance quality and generate appropriate price/quality
tradeoffs.
We approach these problems through the lens of antitrust law,
which is government's principal tool for promoting competition
and overseeing private markets. With support from the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation's Investigator Award Program in
Health Policy Research, we have embarked upon a two-year re-
search endeavor exploring quality competition in health care. This
Article outlines the intellectual framework for that project, identi-
fies the range of questions that we hope to address, and articulates
our initial premises. However, a definitive analysis must await the
outcome of our empirical research.
Part I of this Article examines the function of antitrust law in
health care and reveals an essentially unfinished story. Antitrust
law was critical in clearing the space necessary for the market
model to take root and transform the health care industry. It ac-
complished this in large part by rejecting defendants' arguments
about quality that were merely pretexts to forestall active price
competition.' Novel not long ago, these rejections are becoming
rote. Nonetheless, quality concerns persist and are increasingly
complex, raising a need to reexamine and reformulate the inter-
connected roles of competition theory, antitrust law, and health
care regulation.
Part II explores the limitations of antitrust law in addressing
quality competition. The economic models that have become
paradigmatic of modern antitrust law focus on price competition
between products that are perfect substitutes.2 This approach pres-
ents inherent difficulties in evaluating markets where quality
concerns dominate or where there is substantial product differen-
tiation. Part III therefore questions the core assumptions of
antitrust policy in light of common conditions in health care mar-
kets. Complicating factors include the problem of information
asymmetry, the puzzle of buyer concentration, the prevalence of
1. See infra notes 17-22 and accompanying text (discussing National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers and Indiana Federation of Dentists).
2. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (discussing the reliance of antitrust
law on the economic models of monopoly-Coumot-perfect competition to guide antitrust
policy).
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private insurance, and the role of government controls and profes-
sional self-regulation.
Finally, Part IV outlines a plan that holds promise for addressing
these concerns. Our proposed agenda has four components: de-
veloping a taxonomy and standardized vocabulary for quality-based
competition in health care; creating and analyzing a database of
quality issues that have come to the attention of antitrust enforce-
ment; comparing legal constructs of quality to market preferences
and behavior through structured interviews with regulators, pro-
viders, insurers, purchasers, and consumers; and synthesizing our
legal analysis and empirical findings into recommendations for
health care policymakers regarding the role that a competition
policy can play in achieving quality goals. Our prescriptions will
likely- include changes to both antitrust law and the surrounding
regulatory environment, and will attempt to resolve the tradeoffs
between price and non-price competition and between competitive
objectives and noncompetitive objectives in health law and policy.
I. ANTITRUST, QUALITY, AND MEDICAL MARKETS:
AN UNFINISHED STORY
Federal antitrust law represents the primary mechanism by
which government protects competition in the economy.) The core
assumption of antitrust law is that competitive markets are effi-
cient, meaning that sellers produce goods and services in the least
costly manner, prices approximate marginal costs, and resources
are allocated to their most valued ends. This assumption applies to
markets where competition takes place in terms of price, as well as
to markets where competition is based predominantly on quality
3. Anticompetitive behavior may include mergers; collaborations on products, terri-
tories, prices, or standards; refusals to deal; and affiliations among suppliers, manufacturers,
and distributors. Antitrust laws are primarily enforced by the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and come into play when a single seller
becomes powerful enough to influence market conditions or when more than one seller
seeks similar advantage by agreement. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act declares un-
lawful "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade ... ." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1994). Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits monopolization and attempted
monopolization. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Section 7 of the Clayton Act condemns mergers
and acquisitions where the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). Finally, section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). See generally
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAw OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE (1994) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY] (providing a
comprehensive analysis of legal principles and policy issues concerning antitrust law).
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(the term we use to denote considerations other than price).4 With
respect to health care, this means that courts start with the belief
that if private markets are permitted to operate in a free and unre-
strained manner, market forces will determine the appropriate
prices for medical services, the appropriate organizational forms
for health care financing and delivery, the appropriate tradeoffs
between price and quality, and the appropriate tradeoffs among
different quality attributes.5
Unfortunately, this faith in markets can be misplaced. Health
care markets could provide either too much or too little quality for
the price. 6 Under traditional systems of fee-for-service payment
coupled with pervasive insurance coverage, competition was chan-
neled from price to quality and arguably produced more quality
than was socially optimal.7 Under modem systems of pre-payment,
4. "Quality" and "non-price" competition are slippery concepts as applied to health
care. Indeed, the first step in the research agenda outlined in Part IV is to develop a taxon-
omy for quality competition. The reader of this Article is encouraged to read the terms
"quality" and "non-price" competition in context. At one level, it is useful to draw a broad
distinction between price and all forms of non-price competition. Other times it is helpful to
distinguish "quality" as a medical concern from other forms of non-price competition, such
as location, physical amenities, and waiting times. In addition, horizontal conceptions of
quality-variety and other indicia of product differentiation-can be distinguished from
vertical conceptions. Quality also depends on medical need. Because few health care services
are risk-free, the relationship between quantity and quality is more complicated than is the
case for most consumer goods.
5. In extending antitrust law's full reach to the non-price dimensions of professional
services, the Supreme Court invoked the same efficiency assumptions ordinarily associated
with price competition. See IFTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) ("A
refusal to compete with respect to the package of services offered to customers, no less than
a refusal to compete with respect to the price term of an agreement, impairs the ability of
the market to advance social welfare by ensuring the provision of desired goods and services
to consumers at a price approximating the marginal cost of providing them."); National
Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) ("The assumption that com-
petition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all
elements of a bargain-quality, service, safety, and durability-and not just the immediate
cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers.").
6. See H.E. FREcH III, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN MEDICAL CARE 150-51 (1996)
(examining the conflicting evidence regarding the effects of competition on quality and
non-price attributes). A persistent theme in this Article is the indeterminate welfare implica-
tions of many economic models of non-price competition, forcing reliance on empirical
information that is itself incomplete. See, e.g., discussion infra Parts II.A (contrasting situa-
tions where non-price differentiation increases social welfare with situations where
differentiation can reduce price competition and social welfare), III.E (examining the often
indeterminate relationship between market structure and market outcomes).
7. In traditionally structured health care markets, quality competition may have been
an inefficient response to a lack of price competition, dissipating economic rents without
commensurate social benefit. Rampant quality competition between hospitals, particularly
in terms of intensity of service and use of technology, has ambiguous consequences for con-
sumers. Certainly, patients who are insured against the monetary costs of care value more
highly such nonmonetary benefits as quality, time savings, comfort, and convenience. See
SHERRY GLIED, CHRONIC CONDITION: WHY HEALTH REFORM FAILS 74-78 (1997) (discussing
SUMMER 1999] Competing on Quality of Care
where prices are readily apparent but quality can only be imper-
fectly observed, competition may trigger price concessions that are
possible only if quality is reduced to suboptimal levels. Alterna-
tively, quality can be thought of in terms of product differentiation,
meaning the range of price/quality and quality/quality combina-
tions available to consumers. Along this dimension, health care
markets may exhibit excessive product differentiation if differen-
tiation serves to deter price competition by making it harder for
consumers to comparison shop, or may exhibit insufficient product
differentiation if individual preferences are not reflected in aggre-
gate purchasing decisions of third-party payors or group sponsors
such as private employers, or if legal standards overly restrict the
range of possible product offerings.
the moral hazard effects of private insurance and its consequences for individual consump-
tion decisions in health care markets). However, unrestricted quality competition has also
been described as a "medical arms race," implying that efficiency would improve and con-
sumers would be better off in a more disciplined system. See, e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt,
Reforming the Health Care System: The Universal Dilemma, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 21, 36 (1993);
James C. Robinson & Harold S. Luft, Competition and the Cost of Hospital Care, 1972 to 1982,
257 JAMA 3241, 3244 (1987). This is particularly worthy of concern at the individual level
because of the physical risks associated with invasive medical care, and at the social level
because of the tenuous connection between investment in health care technology and im-
provement of basic health indicators such as life expectancy.
In today's managed health care system, quality competition appears to be driving con-
sumer choice among Medicare HMOs. Until recently, the premium the federal government
paid HMOs serving Medicare beneficiaries was based on the average cost of fee-for-service
Medicare in the same geographic area-the Adjusted Average Per Capita Cost (AAPCC). See
PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 87-112
(1995) (describing traditional and recommended Medicare risk program payment policies).
Yet it appears that HMOs, which still account for only about 15% of Medicare enrollment,
attract healthier individuals who incur below-average costs. SeeJoseph P. Newhouse et al.,
Risk Adjustment and Medicare: Taking a Closer Look, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 26, 29.
To the extent that there is active competition in the market, the resulting windfall is often
transformed into higher enrollee benefits, such as outpatient prescription drug coverage, as
Medicare HMOs competed with one another on non-price grounds. This "overpayment" has
attracted the attention of government budget-cutters. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PUB. No. HEHS-96-21, MEDICARE MANAGED CARE: GROWING ENROLLMENT ADDS
URGENCY TO FIXING HMO PAYMENT PROBLEM (1995). The Balanced Budget Act of 1997
required the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) to develop risk-adjusters, com-
petitive bidding systems, and other methods to squeeze out surplus. See MEDICARE PAYMENT
ADVISORY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 27-46
(1999) (describing the new Medicare+Choice program). Of course, the popularity of Medi-
care managed care depends considerably on the availability of these "extra" benefits.
8. Price/quality differentiation reflects different combinations of price and quality at-
tributes, such as low-price-low-quality options and high-price-high-quality options.
Quality/quality differentiation envisions different possible combinations of quality attributes
that consumers could select from. Some consumers may prefer the latest technology and
highly invasive procedures. Other consumers may prefer alternative treatments, neighbor-
hood clinics, or a reputation for a friendly bedside manner.
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While economists have long recognized the complexities of non-
price competition, 9 antitrust courts typically employ simpler mod-
els of competition based on price and output, either ignoring
quality as a competitive dimension or assuming that it will occur in
tandem with price competition.0 This approach allows courts to
condemn anticompetitive practices that result in higher prices and
lower quality, but places situations where consumers are getting
more but paying more, or paying less but getting less, outside their
analytic reach." In Marshfield Clinic,2 a dispute between the largest
insurer and the largest multispecialty medical clinic in Wisconsin,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected
the plaintiff's argument that the higher prices charged by the
Marshfield Clinic constituted credible evidence of market power.13
Instead, without defining what he meant by "quality" or explaining
how much one should pay to get it, Judge Posner praised the
clinic's reputation for excellence, and noted that "[g]enerally you
must pay more for higher quality.' 4 At the same time, Judge Pos-
ner questioned the quality of managed care, observing that "the
HMO's incentive is to keep you healthy if it can but if you get very
sick... to let you die as quickly and cheaply as possible.'' There is
an element of truth to both of these observations, but such state-
ments hardly offer a systematic assessment of quality and. provide
little guidance as to how antitrust law should address tradeoffs be-
tween quality and price.
Although its analytic power to assess price/quality tradeoffs is
underdeveloped, antitrust law is no stranger to the quality debate
in health care. In the 1970s and 1980s, principles of market com-
petition were introduced to the health care system, which was
previously characterized by professional decision making, patient
9. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, Price and Non-price Competition, 76 J. POL. ECON. 149
(1968). For earlier economic treatments of quality competition, see LAWRENCE ABBOTT,
QUALITY AND COMPETITION (1955); Robert Dorfman & Peter 0. Steiner, Optimal Advertising
and Optimal Quality, 64 Am. ECON. REv. 826 (1954).
10. See E. Thomas Sullivan, On Non-price Competition: An Economic and Marketing Analysis,
45 U. PITT. L. REv. 771, 773-76 (1984) (discussing the limitations of constructing an anti-
trust policy exclusively in terms of economic models of price-quantity competition); see also
authorities cited infra note 55 (discussing the price myopia of current antitrust analysis).
11. See William M. Sage, Judge Posner's RFP: Antitrust Law and Managed Care, HEALTH
Air., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 44, 56-57 (discussing the inability of current antitrust framework to
address issues of health care quality) [hereinafter Sage, Antitrust Law and Managed Care].
12. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1184 (1996).
13. See id. at 1411-12.
14. Id. at 1412.
15. Id. at 1410.
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deference, and price-insensitive insurance payment. 6 Antitrust en-
forcement played an important role in the rise of the market
model by refuting the traditional view that professional standards
and practices should not be subjected to legal scrutiny for potential
anticompetitive effects. 7 In early disputes, quality considerations
were often invoked by professionals to justify collective action to
keep prices high. In National Society of Professional Engineers,8 for
example, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that com-
petitive bidding would lead buyers of engineering services to pay
insufficient attention to quality and safety. 9
A variant of the same argument failed to persuade the Court in a
case involving health care: Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Fed-
eration of Dentists. 20  The Indiana Federation of Dentists, a
professional association, agreed among its members to refuse to
submit dental x-rays to insurers who requested them in order to
verify the need for treatment. The Federation argued that patient
welfare is enhaaiced when treatment decisions are left to profes-
sional discretion. The Court distilled this position to the conviction
"that an unrestrained market in which consumers are given access
to the information they believe to be relevant to their choices will
lead them to make unwise and even dangerous choices,, 21 and re-
jected it as "nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy
of the Sherman Act.
22
The major contribution of antitrust doctrine in these cases was
to pull aside the curtain on assertions of patient protection that
concealed economically self-interested behavior by health care
providers, and thereby affirm consumer sovereignty as a guiding
principle in health care as in other industries. Courts tended to
16. See Peter J. Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions: Price and Non-
Price Competition in Hospital Markets, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 727, 732-38 (1999)
[hereinafter Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions] (contrasting the "old"
and "emerging" economic regimes in health care markets and examining the increasingly
important role of price competition).
17. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (declaring the Fed-
eration's policy of refusing to provide dental x-rays to third party payors an unreasonable
restraint on trade); Arizona v. Maricopa Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (declaring per se
illegal the medical society's schedule of maximum fees to be charged insurance companies);
National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (declaring per se illegal
the professional association's ethical rule prohibiting competitive bidding); Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (condemning as unlawful the bar association's
schedule of minimum fees for legal services which were enforced with the threat of discipli-
nary sanctions for "unethical" conduct).
18. National Soc'y of ProflEng'rs, 435 U.S. at 679.
19. See id. at 695.
20. See Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 447.
21. See id. at 463.
22. See id. (quoting National Soc'y of Profl Engrs, 435 U.S. at 695).
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proceed carefully, however, recognizing their own limitations
where complex medical issues were concerned, and qualifying
their rulings to accommodate professional ideals to the extent they
were compatible with general market mechanisms. 2 Antitrust law
in this era therefore did not address quality competition as an end
in itself, but rather opened up the health care system to price
competition by establishing that quality considerations were insuf-
ficient to exclude health care from a market paradigm.
In its most recent term, the Supreme Court considered competi-
tion for dental services in California Dental Association v. Federal
Trade Commission.24 The defendant, a non-profit professional asso-
ciation, had enforced its ethical guidelines to "preclude[]
advertising that characterized a dentist's fees as being low, reason-
able or affordable, . .. [and to] prohibit[] all quality claims."2
5
Rehearsing the lessons of past decisions, a unanimous Court had
no difficulty confirming the FTC's jurisdiction over the defendant
despite its non-commercial form, holding that "the economic
benefits conferred upon the CDA's profit-seeking professionals
plainly fall within the object of enhancing its members' 'profit.' ,26
However, the Court divided sharply as to the likely effect on quality
competition of restricting consumer information, with the majority
holding that the ban could not be condemned as anticompetitive
absent full rule-of-reason analysis on the grounds that "a market
23. The strongest indication that the Court might specifically tailor a set of antitrust
rules for the learned professions was contained in Goldfarb's infamous footnote 17:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business
is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the
Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as inter-
changeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the
professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service as-
pect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice,
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context,
be treated differently.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773, 788-89 n.17 (1975). The promise of a
uniquely tailored set of antitrust rules for the professions, however, was never actually real-
ized. See Thomas E. Kauper, The Role of Quality of Health Care Considerations in Antitrust
Analysis, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Sping 1988, at 273, 281-92 (examining the case law
from Goldfarb to Indiana Federation of Dentists). What would be useful today is not a set of
rules designed to accommodate the "public service" aspects of the professions, but rather a
set of antitrust principles that could more directly address underlying economic problems of
price and non-price competition.
24. 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999).
25. Id. at 1618-19 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting In re
Cal. Dental Ass'n, 121 F.T.C. 190, 301, 308 (1996)).
26. Id. at 1611.
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for professional services . . . magnifies the dangers to competition
associated with misleading advertising."27
Importantly, not even California Dental Association addresses
price/quality tradeoffs, except to assume that the right mix would
emerge from competition. Now that markets have attained a
dominant position in health care, the demands placed on competi-
tion, and hence on antitrust law, are different and greater. Ideally,
competition in health care should achieve not only fair prices and
full output, but also appropriate quality. Unfortunately, competi-
tion in health care may be falling short in that respect. A few
employers factor performance into their insurance purchasing de-
cisions," and non-price attributes of health plans such as choice
among and reputation of physicians continue to attract individual
consumers. On the other hand, many consumers of health insur-
ance and health care services bargain aggressively for low prices,
but take quality for granted. 9
Health policy and antitrust law must adopt a proactive rather
than reactive posture with respect to quality in this new era. It is no
longer enough to dispel myths about preserving quality in order to
promote price competition. Instead, antitrust enforcers and courts
must work to create conditions under which quality competition
can flourish, preserving benefits such as performance, choice, serv-
ice and innovation. Unfortunately, no compelling model of quality
competition in health care yet exists that would allow courts to ex-
301pand their vision.
To the contrary, courts deciding health care antitrust cases seem
to be struggling with quality as a competitive dimension, sometimes
adopting radical nonmarket approaches by default. In FTC v.
27. Id. at 1613. One antitrust scholar regards the Court's reluctance to characterize re-
strictions on health care advertising as anticompetitive as part of a legislative and judicial
backlash against the perceived excesses of the managed care marketplace. See Thomas L.
Greaney, Antitrust and the Healthcare Industry: The View from the Three Branches (California Den-
tal Association v. FTC, United States v. Aetna-Prudential, and Congressional Support for the
Physician Union Movement), 32J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 391 (1999).
28. See MICHAEL L. MILLENSON, DEMANDING MEDICAL EXCELLENCE: DOCTORS AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 206-07, 358 (1997) (discussing the experience
of specific employer plans).
29. See JACK A. MEYER ET AL., THEORY AND REALITY OF VALUE-BASED PURCHASING:
LESSONS FROM THE PIONEERS (Agency for Health Care Policy and Research Pub. No. 98-.
0004, 1998) (reporting lack of attention to quality in purchasing decisions by employers).
30. See Kauper, supra note 23, at 292-319 (providing an extensive examination of the
manner in which the law, the courts, and the enforcement agencies have addressed-and
failed to address-quality concerns); see also infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text
(discussing the indeterminacy of economic models of non-price competition).
SUMMER 1999] 1077
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Butterworth Health Corp.,3' the district judge allowed the two largest
hospitals in Grand Rapids, Michigan to merge on the condition
that the hospitals agree to a consent decree that included extensive
restrictions on future competitive behavior. 2 Moreover, the district
court appeared unconcerned about possible price increases, on
the assumption that the money would automatically be spent by
the community board to improve "quality. 3 This type of reasoning
highlights the need for a framework within which price/quality
and quality/quality tradeoffs can be addressed by courts, antitrust
enforcers, and health care policymakers as they shape the future
competitive environment of the health care system.
II. NON-PRICE COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST LAW
"Antitrust" law is a uniquely American construct. Most European
countries speak of "competition" law, which is based on a broader
conception of government's role in consumer protection and eco-
nomic development.34 It is helpful to think explicitly in terms of
constructing a competition policy for health care markets, of which
antitrust law, although important, is simply one component. A
competition policy recognizes that markets do not exist in isolation
from public institutions and social values and that defining the
boundaries between market and non-market objectives, and be-
tween antitrust law and other forms of government regulation, will
play an essential role in promoting health care quality. Before tak-
ing two steps forward in this direction, however, it is necessary to
take one step back and consider in greater detail the strengths and
weaknesses of existing price-based antitrust law.
Modern antitrust law is premised on a few basic economic mod-
els and the essential belief that a relatively seamless continuum can
31. 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affd without opinion, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir.),
reported in full, 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,863 (6th Cir. 1997).
32. Id. at 1305-09 (outlining terms of the consent decree).
33. Id. at 1296-97.
34. For an overview of European competition law, see D.C. GOYDER, EC COMPETITION
LAw 8-14 (2d ed. 1993); RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 12-16 (3d ed. 1993). While
there are important differences between American antitrust law and European competition
law, there are also many similarities and the conceptual differences are sometimes more
semantic than substantive. Increasingly, the law on both sides of the Atlantic is being in-
formed by common sets of economic models and theories. See generally W.S. COMANOR ET
AL., COMPETITION POLICY IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND INSTITU-
TIONS (1990) (comparing and contrasting European and North American institutions for
antitrust enforcement and examining the increasing influence of economic theory on both
sides of the Atlantic).
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be constructed between them. The model of perfect competition
for a single homogeneous good anchors one end of this contin-
uum.35 Anchoring the other end is the model explaining the
behavior of a single product monopolist.3 6 Bridging these two ex-
tremes and explaining the behavior of industries with small
numbers of competitors (oligopolies) is the Cournot model of
price/quantity competition.37 The Cournot model predicts a direct
relationship between the number of competitors in the market
(level of competition) and how closely the market approximates
the results of perfect competition. According to the model, the
larger the number of firms, the more competitive the industry;
conversely, the higher the level of economic concentration (the
fewer the number of competitors), the closer the market will ap-
proximate the outcomes of a pure monopoly.38 This framework
underlies the structure-conduct-performance orientation of anti-
trust law and the corresponding reliance of the law upon market
share data and concentration ratios to establish presumptions
39
about the existence and effects of market power.
While this framework is powerful in terms of its simplicity, and
hence its translatability into a coherent antitrust policy, the con-
struct has substantial limitations. An essential assumption of these
models is that the products of one firm are perfect substitutes for
the products of another. This implies that there is no product dif-
ferentiation and that firms do not engage in non-price
competition. Traditional models are not well equipped to examine
35. See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 3, at 3-8 (describing the
model of perfect competition and outlining its assumptions). For discussions of the model
of perfect competition in economic textbooks, see DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICRO-
ECONOMIC THEORY 264-67 (1990) [hereinafter KREPS, MICROECONOMICS]; HAL R. VARIAN,
INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIcs: A MODERN APPROACH 368-70 (1987) [hereinafter VAR-
IAN, INTERMEDIATE]; HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 82-85 (2d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter VARIAN, ADVANCED].
36. See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 3, at 12-14 (describing
model of a single product monopoly and the effects of monopoly on price and output). For
discussions of the model of single product monopoly in economic textbooks, see KREPS,
MICROECONOMICS, supra note 35, at 299-302; VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE, supra note 35, at 414-
16; VARIAN, ADVANCED, supra note 35, at 79-81.
37. See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 3, at 152-54 (outlining
the Cournot model of quantity-based competition). For discussions of the model of Cournot
quantity-based competition in economic textbooks, see KREPs, MICROECONOMICS, supra note
35, at 326-28; VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE, supra note 35, at 447-51; VARIAN, ADVANCED, supra
note 35, at 99-100.
38. See authorities cited supra note 37.
39. See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 3, at 42-47 (describing
the history, development, and criticisms of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm);
see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 19 n.36 (1984)
(questioning the soundness of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm).
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markets where quality competition dominates or where other
forms of non-price competition are central concerns. 40 A more sub-
tle point is that this antitrust framework applies well only if market
behavior is consistent with the type of strategic interaction assumed
in the models.41 If actual market behavior resembles other forms of
strategic interaction, such as a Bertrand bidding model, then theS 42
Cournot quantity framework can be misleading. Similarly, the
modern antitrust framework is of questionable utility if the contin-
uum between perfect competition and pure monopoly is not
seamless. Older theories of monopolistic competition and the
more recent game theoretic literature cast substantial doubt on
this assumption.4 ' Finally, the static nature of these models makes
them less useful in evaluating dynamic changes or in addressing
issues such as the effects of market structure and strategic interac-
tion on innovation, changes in productive technology, and changes
in organizational form.44
A. Price Is Not a Perfect Proxy for Quality
Once the monopoly-Cournot-perfect competition framework is
abandoned, economic models have little to offer with respect to
40. See Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural
Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 33-36 (1994) (describing how most economic markets
violate the assumption that all products are perfect substitutes and examining the reasons
underlying product differentiation).
41. See Interview with Economist Robert D. Willig, ANTITRUST, Spring 1997, at 11, 15
("[T]he mode of interactive conduct among firms [can be] markedly more important to
consumer welfare than market structure itself.") (statement of Robert Willig); see also Timo-
thy J. Muris, Product Differentiation: Economics and Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 303, 311
(1997) (noting that antitrust scholars should be more sensitive to the behavioral assump-
tions underlying the economic models that they invoke).
42. See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (contrasting the assumptions and
predictions of the Cournot and Bertrand models).
43. See EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 224-26 (1985)
(contrasting economic theories of monopolistic competition and its implications for anti-
trust policy With the economic theories of the neo-classical Chicago School and the game
theory analysis of what Hovenkamp terms the "post-Chicago" school). For a discussion of
monopolistic competition in the context of the health care industry, see Peter Hilsenrath,
Monopolistic Competition and the Health Care Sector, 4 HEALTH SERVS. MGMT. RES. 82 (1991).
44. See Arthur, supra note 40, at 15-19 (discussing the tension between antitrust law's
focus on static concepts such as allocative efficiency and dynamic concerns such as techno-
logical innovation); see also William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Antitrust: Sources of
Dynamic and Static Inefficiencies, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 82
(Thomas M.Jorde & DavidJ. Teece eds., 1992); Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures
and Antitrust Policy, 1995 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 16-30.
Competing on Quality of Care
non-price competition but indeterminacy, both in terms of welfare
analysis (whether a specific result is desirable or undesirable) and
in terms of the likely effect that market structure will have on mar-
ket outcomes.46 Implicit in the economics of traditional antitrust
law is a belief that price competition serves as an acceptable proxy
for non-price competition. In the absence of a generally applicable
theory of non-price competition, it is plausible to assert that anti-
trust law best protects quality by protecting price competition.46
Ostensibly, firms that engage in quality competition do so at some
positive cost. Under competitive conditions, these higher costs
should be reflected in higher prices. By preserving active price
competition, the argument goes, the traditional antitrust frame-
work indirectly protects a range of non-price competition as well.
In assessing this claim, it is helpful to distinguish between
"vertical" and "horizontal" concepts of quality.47 Vertical quality is
premised on the idea that some products are objectively "better,"
so that competition involves the intensity of inputs or non-price
attributes. This is a commonly held perspective in health services
research, which often uses performance statistics like hospital
mortality rates or staffing ratios as quality indicators. Horizontal
measures of quality, by contrast, emphasize the provision of a
range of product attributes to suit heterogeneous consumer
preferences. This view is typical among economists, who assume
that efficiency is most likely to be achieved when many options are
available to consumers. For example, the current trend toward
diversity among managed care organizations is a horizontal
concept.
Vertical and horizontal conceptions of quality have different
implications for price/quality tradeoffs. The argument that price
competition is an effective proxy for non-price competition is most
credible for vertical quality competition-competition between
45. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of competition
in traditional health care markets); see also infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text
(discussing the indeterminacy of economic analysis of non-price competition more gener-
ally). The focus of antitrust law on price and its marginalization of issues of quality can be
explained by the absence of comprehensive economic models governing non-price competi-
tion. Given the current state of economic understanding, it would be difficult to establish a
single coherent antitrust policy governing all forms of non-price competition. Economic
theory, however, can be useful in providing insights into non-price competition on an indus-
try-by-industry basis.
46. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Anti-
trust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 752 (1997) ("[P]rice competition
will often serve as a reasonably good proxy for non-price competition.").
47. "Vertical" concepts of quality are consistent with the forms of price/quality differ-
entiation discussed supra note 8. "Horizontal" concepts of quality are consistent with forms
of quality/quality differentiation. See id.
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firms based on the intensity of inputs-because weighing price
against quality is relatively straightforward. The proxy notion is less
persuasive when horizontal quality competition is the dominant
concern, i.e., where firms compete by providing combinations of
different quality attributes. Horizontal quality competition corre-
sponds closely with forms of product differentiation. Once again,
the welfare analysis becomes more complicated. If differentiation
occurs in response to heterogeneous consumer preferences, then
providing a range of different price/quality and quality/quality
tradeoffs can be welfare enhancing.4' Differentiation, however, can
also be used to mute pressures for price competition by making
products less than perfect substitutes.49 In addition, differentiation
can increase consumer search and information costs, and there-
fore can give individual producers a degree of market power over
discrete sets of consumers. 5° In these cases, differentiation may re-
duce social welfare.
For example, health policy experts continue to struggle with the
normative implications of standardizing insurance benefits. The
theory of "managed competition" postulates that uncontrolled
market forces will lead to suboptimal outcomes, which can be pre-
vented through active sponsorship of insurance plans by expert
intermediary organizations. A central component of managed
competition is the creation of a standard benefits package. If in-
surers offer a standard package, the theory goes, differences in
scope of coverage will not render plans non-comparable by indi-
vidual purchasers in terms of cost (premium) or linear quality
characteristics (measurable health outcomes, consumer satisfaction
scores). In other words, managed competition consciously sacri-
48. See Arthur, supra note 40, at 34-35 ("The variety of goods and services derived from
product competition is far more valuable than its costs to allocative efficiency. The success of
product differentiation as a business strategy rests entirely upon consumer preference. Con-
sumers like variety. Tastes differ and few want the same choice day after day, even if it could
be had a bit cheaper.").
49. Quality differentiation can be used to avoid active price competition. If firms pro-
duce and sell identical products, there will be strong competitive pressures driving price to
marginal costs and resulting in low or non-existent profits. The principle of "maximum
differentiation" suggests that firms may provide higher or lower levels of quality simply in an
effort to reduce price competition. SeeJ. Jaskold Gabszewicz & J.F. Thisse, Price Competition,
Quality and Income Disparities, 20 J. EcON. THEORY 340 (1979); Avner Shaked & John Sutton,
Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation, 49 REv. ECON. STUD. 3 (1982).
50. See Arthur, supra note 40, at 36 ("The problem of information gaps is exacerbated
in markets for differentiated products. Buyers must now search not only for information as
to sellers and their prices, but also for data on product quality and features.").
51. See Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, HEALTH
AFF., Supp. 1993, at 24 (outlining the history, theory, and rationale underlying proposals for
managed competition).
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fices the value to consumers of horizontal quality-broad choice
between different types of benefit plans-in order to stimulate
competition based on price and vertical quality.
52
On the other hand, a substantial subset of pro-competitive
health reformers support "medical savings accounts" (MSAs),
which give individual consumers broad, tax-subsidized choices
among individual health care services, usually in conjunction with
the purchase of bare-bones, "catastrophic" insurance 5  MSAs are
predicated on the assumption that price competition will be most
vigorous if consumers comparison shop for individual, differenti-
ated services. MSAs therefore attach considerable value to
horizontal quality. As the managed competition and MSA debate
illustrates, the effects of price and non-price competition depend
critically on the broader parameters in which such competition
takes place. The type of constraints that are placed on the market
will determine the intensity and range of quality competition that
will emerge. There are some instances where price can serve as a
workable proxy for non-price concerns, but there are others where
it cannot.
B. Judicial Responses to the Price-Quality Mismatch
At a conceptual level, courts understand the importance of
protecting the integrity of non-price competition. 4 Unfortunately,
while judges acknowledge the need to be sensitive to issues of
quality, the law does not have a well-developed framework for
addressing these concerns.55  The most important judicial
52. It has proved difficult to reach either economic or political consensus on the spe-
cifics of a standard benefits package. See GLIED, supra note 7, at 170-75 (describing
standardization of benefits and the Clinton health plan).
53. See Kenneth E. Thorpe, Medical Savings Accounts: Design and Policy Issues, HEALTH
AFF., Fall 1995, at 295 (exploring the policy rationale and implications of medical savings
accounts).
54. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 n.5
(1988) (recognizing that product standardization can hurt consumers by reducing con-
sumer choice and decreasing quality competition); Competitive Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 87
F.3d 522, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("The test of a competitive market is whether consumers are
offered the lowest possible prices or more or better services.") (emphasis added); Town Sound &
Custom Tops v. Chrysler Motors, 959 F.2d 468, 487 (3d Cir. 1992) ("In an uncompetitive
market, however, buyers may be forced to pay more for the same package than they would
have to pay in a competitive market (or, equivalently, to accept lesser quality for the same
price).").
55. See Averitt & Lande, supra note 46, at 750-51 ("In more ordinary antitrust cases,
however, where the elimination of nonprice competition is not so obviously central to the
violation, the enforcement agencies have sometimes tended to deemphasize this factor. For
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accommodations come in the areas of market definition, the
leeway given vertical non-price restraints under the rule of reason,
and rules concerning judicial deference to legislative bodies under
doctrines governing the implied repeal of antitrust law and state
action immunity.
1. Market Definition--Courts tacitly acknowledge quality con-
cerns when they define product markets to determine whether
defendants possess market power. Markets are often defined
more narrowly for highly differentiated products on the theory
that consumers will not accept products with substantially different
quality characteristics. One problem with this approach is that the
"either/or" process of product classification fails to appreciate de-
grees of difference and can lead to judicial outcomes that are stark
and discontinuous. If the court opts for a broad market definition,
the relevance of the non-price concerns is frequently lost in the
subsequent competitive analysis. If the court adopts a narrow mar-
ket definition, then the non-price considerations may actually be
given disproportionate weight.
In United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center,57 the Depart-
ment of Justice challenged a merger between the two largest
hospitals in Nassau County, New York. Given the proximity of New
York City, the government's case depended on defining a market
example, the conventional antitrust analysis under Section 7 of the Clayton Act concentrates
almost exclusively on the price effects of a merger . . . ."); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Nonprice
Competition, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 83, 83 (1993) ("The role of nonprice competition has not
received enough attention in antitrust analysis. Legal scholars and judges have occasionally
acknowledged nonprice competition with a nod and perhaps even a kind word about the
social utility of nonprice competition, but they quickly return to the more familiar subject of
price competition."); Sullivan, supra note 10, at 776 ("It turns out, however, that the case law
continues to place price at the core of competition analysis. The courts have little justifica-
tion for continuing to use a theory that explains only one competitive variable merely
because no single model or theory has yet been advanced which examines, explains, and
predicts market behavior for every market. Reality dictates that nonprice motivations are
relevant in interpreting and characterizing market behavior and ultimately for interpreting
competition."). But see Kauper, supra note 23, at 277-80 (arguing that quality issues are im-
portant in medical antitrust cases and that courts have largely avoided dealing with such
issues directly, but cautioning that such quality claims are inherently complex and may not
be capable of adjudication in the courts).
56. See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 3, at 91-96 (describing
how product differentiation complicates the process of product definition and how some
courts have responded); Thomas J. Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust: The Case
of Nonfungible Goods, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1630-35 (1987) (examining the difficulties
caused by product differentiation for market definition and the implications for antitrust
analysis, with a particular focus on theories of predation); Thomas L. Greaney, Managed
Competition, Integrated Delivery Systems and Antitrust, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1507, 1537 (1994)
(criticizing the DOJ-FTC policy statements for paying inadequate attention to the problem
of product differentiation).
57. 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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that captured what it perceived as the merging entities' unique
geographic and product-related characteristics. Therefore, the
government proposed that the relevant market be limited to so-
called "anchor hospitals"-nearby institutions with prestigious
reputations and sophisticated facilities that the government
claimed were indispensable to the success of any managed care
network offering insurance to Nassau County residents." The court
rejected this proposed product market definition, 59 and the eco-
nomic significance of the alleged "anchor" status of the hospitals
was lost in the court's evaluation of the competitive effects of the
merger.
Similarly, in Marshfield,'° the court's rejection of an "HMO mar-
ket" in favor of a general market for health care financing
rendered moot any consideration of the range of possible man-
aged care products and the scope economies or demand-side
efficiencies that they might engender.6 The Marshfield decision
also factored non-price considerations into the determination of
whether a "natural monopoly" defense existed to claims of mo-
nopolization, but did so again through the technique of product
market definition. Dismissing the possibility that consumers in a
rural area might be better served by having separate physician
competitors rather than a single satellite of the defendant clinic,
Judge Posner observed that "[t]welve physicians competing in a
county would be competing to provide horse-and-buggy medi-
cine., 62 Modern, high-technology, specialized medicine likely
required a single, integrated enterprise, the court concluded, in
essence folding these quality attributes into the market definition
and exculpating the defendant on that basis alone.
2. Vertical Restraints-Antitrust law makes another concession
to quality concerns in the context of vertical non-price restraints
such as exclusive dealerships and distribution agreements. Vertical
non-price restraints are evaluated under the rule of reason and are
58. See id. at 137.
59. See id. at 140. But cf FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1073 (D.D.C. 1997)
(granting an injunction against a proposed merger based on evidence of market power in
the market for "consumable office supplies [sold] through office superstores"). In the Staples
case, the court overcame its "initial gut reaction" to define the market more broadly, id. at
1075, especially given that nearly 95% of consumable office supplies are sold by supermar-
kets and small stores, because of evidence that prices were significantly higher in areas
where either Staples or Office Depot, but not both, did business. See id. at 1076-77.
60. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1406 (7th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1184 (1996).
61. See id. at 1410-12. For a critique of the court's product market definition see Sage,
Antitrust Law and Managed Care, supra note 11, at 49-52.
62. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d at 1412.
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not considered per se illegal. 3 This deference is premised on the
assumed efficiency of decisions made by a single firm. If a manu-
facturer imposes non-price restraints on its dealers, such as
territorial limitations, the manufacturer is assumed to be doing so
to maximize the value of the branded product (although courts
remain concerned about vertical restraints serving as a cover for
what is actually a dealer cartel).64 As long as there is sufficiently
strong inter-brand competition, courts trust the manufacturer to
make appropriate price/quality and quality/quality tradeoffs in
response to consumer demand, empower manufacturers to im-
plement those tradeoffs through a system of vertical non-price
restraints, and assume that the manufacturer's choices will en-
hance consumer and social well-being (i.e., will be allocatively
efficient) .65
Ironically, there may be good reason to second guess the appro-
priateness of some vertical non-price restraints in integrated health
care markets. Firms providing health care services and financing
may have incentives to systematically underprovide quality,66 espe-
cially in situations where reductions in quality are less visible to
consumers than outright denials of promised benefits. In this set-
ting, simple deference to the assumed rationality of intra-firm
price/quality tradeoffs may not be an optimal policy response. The
critical empirical question is whether and under what circum-
stances inter-plan competition will effectively counteract inefficient
intra-plan incentives.
63. Under the rule of reason, vertical restraints are subjected to a case-by-case assess-
ment to determine the economic impact that the restraint will have on competition. See
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servs., Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762 (1984) ("In Sylvania we empha-
sized that the legality of arguably anticompetitive conduct should be judged primarily by its
'market impact.' "); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)
("Under this rule, the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding
whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on
competition.").
64. See HOVENEAMp, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 3, at 395-99 (examining
the concern that vertical restraints may be manifestation of dealer collusion).
65. See Henry N. Butler & Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical Restraints of Trade as Contractual
Integration: A Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics, and Organiza-
tion Theory, 32 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1061-65 (1983) (examining the efficiency justifications and
corresponding consumer benefits associated with vertical restraints); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.,
The Case for Presuming the Legality of Quality Motivated Restrictions on Distribution, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 19-23 (1988) (examining quality-based motives for vertical restraints).
66. See PeterJ. Hammer, Medical Antitrust Reform: Arrow, Coase and the Changing Structure
of the Firm, in THE PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM (G. Bloche ed., forthcoming
2000) [hereinafter Hammer, Medical Antitrust Reform] (characterizing the emergence of
managed care in terms of a Coasian transformation of the firms providing health care, and
cautioning that integrated providers of health care financing and delivery may have substan-
tial incentives to underprovide care).
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3. Implied Repeal and the State Action Doctrine--While not spe-
cifically designed to address problems of quality and non-price
competition, the implied repeal of the antitrust laws and the state
action doctrine can remove entire industries or sets of issues from
antitrust scrutiny. In industries where competition may be undesir-
able, legislative action can trump antitrust law and substitute
regulation for market forces. When this occurs through federal
legislation, courts term the outcome express or implied repeal of
antitrust law.67 For example, some aspects of health insurance are
exempt from antitrust oversight under the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.68 Similarly, under the state action doctrine, state governments
can elect to supersede competition in industries by clearly articu-
lating and actively supervising an alternative regime.69 This
immunity extends to private parties acting pursuant to the state
701mandate .
State action immunity is important in the health care industry.
Since 1992, twenty states have enacted laws specifically designed to
immunize hospitals, health professionals, or other health care en-
terprises from antitrust scrutiny. 7 1 The first such law, enacted in
Maine, specified "enhancement of quality" as the leading justifica-
tion for granting a "certificate of public advantage," followed
closely by preservation of access to services for "communities" (not
consumers per se) and reduction of redundant capacity. 72 State
attorneys general have also entered into consent decrees with
health care entities that promise non-price benefits or efficiency
67. See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 3, at 652 (discussing the
doctrines of express and implied repeal of the antitrust laws).
68. See, e.g., Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 130-34 (1982); Group
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211-33 (1979) (identifying the policy
relationship between insurer and insured, the spreading of risk, and practices limited to the
insurance industry as indicia of the "business of insurance" exempt from antitrust scrutiny
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act); see also HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra
note 3, at 663-69 (discussing the scope and operation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
69. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Co., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980) (concluding that state action immunity will extend to private parties provided
there is a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition
with regulation, and the private conduct is actively supervised by the state); see also
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 3, at 670-85 (examining the state
action doctrine).
70. See California Retail Liquor Dealers, 445 U.S. at 105.
71. See Fred J. Hellinger, Antitrust Enforcement in the Healthcare Industry: The Expanding
Scope of State Enforcement, 33 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1477, 1480-86 (1998) (summarizing the
recent activities of states that have attempted to exempt health care conduct from antitrust
liability under the state action doctrine); see also UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PUB. No. HEHS-94-220, HEALTH CARE: FEDERAL AND STATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS
CONCERNING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 10-13 (1994) (detailing the efforts of states to
afford hospitals and other health care providers immunity under the state action doctrine).
72. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1883(2), (4) (A) (West Supp. 1998).
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gains from mergers or joint ventures. These agreements usually
contain provisions that limit price increases or profits or guarantee
73the pass-through of savings to consumers.
In summary, judges and legislatures have at their disposal a lim-
ited set of tools for incorporating quality concerns into antitrust
policy in instances where price competition does not predict non-
price competition. In two senses, however, these are only partial
responses. First, they account for only a small portion of cases pre-
senting significant non-price issues. Second, they are incompletely
theorized, meaning that they do not connect with one another in a
coherent manner. Improving on this situation requires a nuanced
analysis of market failure in health care, to which we now turn.
III. CHALLENGES IN UNDERSTANDING QUALITY
COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE
Developing a framework to guide judicial assessments of non-
price concerns under current law, or to assist legislators in
formulating effective interventions, requires a clearer under-
standing of quality competition in health care markets. 74 At its
core, a competition policy for health care seeks answers to some
very basic questions. What kind of health care do we as a society
want? How much health care can we afford? How do we get it? The
first question concerns health care goals. The second seeks
normative benchmarks vis-a-vis other societal needs. The third
implicates comparative institutional analysis and asks what
combination of market and non-market mechanisms will give us
what we desire. Traditional antitrust analysis assumes that private
markets can provide self-contained answers to all of these
questions, determining what type and how many services people
73. See, e.g., United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 144
(1997) (commenting on the hospitals' agreement with the New York State Attorney Gen-
eral's Office not to raise prices for two years following the merger); see also FTC v.
Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1303-09 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affid without opin-
ion 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir.), reported in full, 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,863 (6th Cir. 1997)
(imposing a federal consent decree having similar regulatory effects).
74. Readers unfamiliar with health care may be frustrated by the number of issues
identified in this Part and the complex interrelationships that are suggested. Readers famil-
iar with health care may be frustrated by the brief and sometimes superficial treatment these
complicated issues receive. Our intention at this point is to create a checklist of concerns
and suggest a framework in which they can be evaluated. The research agenda outlined in
Part IV will explore these topics in substantially greater detail.
1088 [VOL. 32:4
Competing on Quality of Care
want, how much they are willing to pay, and how those services
should be provided.
This section questions the core assumptions of the antitrust
framework as applied to health care markets. Are health care mar-
kets allocatively efficient? What is the actual relationship between
market structure and market outcomes in health care? What is the
nature of the underlying strategic interaction among health care
providers, payers, and consumers? This section also considers vari-
ous issues that must be addressed in order to derive meaningful
answers to these questions. These factors include the effects of
buyer concentration, the prevalence of private medical insurance,
the effects of state licensure and professional self-regulation, and
dynamic efficiency concerns such as the importance of health care
institutions being "adaptable" and capable of innovation.
A. Allocative Efficiency and Market Failure
As noted earlier, antitrust laws assume that competitive markets
are allocatively efficient5 This assumption implies that markets will
determine the appropriate prices for medical services, the appro-
priate tradeoffs between price and quality, and the appropriate
tradeoffs among different quality attributes. However, failures en-
demic in health care markets make it necessary to seriously
question this assumption. 76 Historically, actual or perceived market
failure made medical services an unlikely candidate for competi-
tion. Although competition arrived nonetheless, market failures
persist and remain core justifications for government intervention.
Three related failures and the regulatory measures that purport to
address them are particularly important to an analysis of competi-
tive conditions: imperfect information, failures of agency, and the
consequences of insurance.
75. In 1975, Clark Havighurst and Jim Blumstein discussed the central issues facing
health care policymakers in terms of allocative efficiency and explored the many reasons
why resources may be misallocated in the health care sector. See Clark C. Havighurst &James
F. Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.
L. REv. 6, 9-11 (1975). Twenty-five years later, we are struggling with the same basic issues in
trying to forge appropriate price/quality tradeoffs in the "No Man's Land" of medical care.
See id. at 15-20.
76. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am.
EcON. Rav. 941 (1963) (evaluating medical markets in terms of market failures and charac-
terizing health care's distinctive non-market institutions as society's efforts to overcome the
consequences of the underlying failures); Greaney, supra note 56, at 1509-13 (discussing the
market failures affecting health care).
SUMMER 1999] 1089
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
As a threshold matter, the existence of imperfections does not
require the abandonment of the market prescription. Some
market failures can be addressed by private conduct that would be
permissible under the antitrust laws. Other market failures may
justify targeted government interventions designed to make
markets work more effectively so that private forces can achieve
efficient outcomes. Still, it is conceivable that failures may be so
severe that governmental action to displace some or all private
market decisions would be called for. The difficulties involved in
supplementing or replacing private markets, however, should not
be underestimated. To do so successfully, policymakers must
determine the type and amount of health care to provide, as well
as the financial commitments to support it, with reference to some
benchmark other than the observed market equilibrium. These are
daunting social and political issues to resolve.
B. Information and Consumer Protection
Information deficits and asymmetries exist at nearly every inter-
face of the health care system, and affect consumers choosing
health coverage, insurers arranging services, patients seeking care,
and health professionals selecting treatment. 7 These asymmetries
undermine the ability of buyers to monitor the competence of sell-
ers and uncover fraud, so that there will always be a need for
oversight and standard-setting in health care. What form this inter-
vention takes, however, is highly contestable. Historically,
imbalances of information justified tight professional control over
the provision of medical services. This professional paradigm en-
couraged uniform standards, strict limits on who can and cannot
practice medicine, and deference to self-regulatory bodies.
By contrast, a market paradigm encourages competition, easier
access for sellers, and the primacy of consumer choice. Disclosure
would be favored over exclusion. A market paradigm would also
move away from licensing and towards accreditation, as part of a
larger shift from externally imposed uniform standards to systems
of tiered or minimum standards. Finally, a market paradigm would
potentially transform professional self-regulation, encouraging
77. See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American
Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1701, 1716-20 (1999) [hereinafter Sage, Regulating Through
Information].
78. See generally GLIED, supra note 7, at 17-35 (contrasting the perspectives and ap-
proaches of the "medicalists" and the "marketists").
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greater competition between self-regulatory bodies and standard-
setting groups.79 The challenge in developing a competition policy
is to anticipate these tensions and establish a workable balance be-
tween spheres of market and professional control.
Regulation adopted to mitigate informational market failures
can influence quality competition."0 Many price/quality tradeoffs
are simply foreclosed because licensure laws, accreditation
practices, certification requirements, malpractice standards of care,
and other minimum quality standards enacted to protect
consumers truncate the range of acceptable quality options.
Additionally, courts interpreting insurance contracts may not
honor price/quality tradeoffs made in advance of illness because of
perceived unfairness when illness strikes, limiting the ability of
private parties to ration resources through credible contractual
pre-commitments.8 l Marketing restrictions imposed to discourage
risk-selection or reduce fraud may further limit information and
decrease product differentiation. Even regulation designed to cure
informational market failure may impose indirect burdens on
quality competition. For example, newly enacted laws that require
disclosure of performance on identified quality measures tend to
channel competition into the areas selected for reporting."2 In
addition, compliance with regulations may be complex, costly, and
time-consuming, favoring large, established organizations and
discouraging new market entrants.
79. See Peter J. Hammer, Price and Quality Competition in Health Care Markets: The Com-
parative Institutional Case Against an Antitrust Exemption for Medical Self-Regulatory Entities, in
ACHIEVING QUALITY IN MANAGED CARE: THE ROLE OF LAw 123, 142 (John D. Blum ed.,
1997) [hereinafter Hammer, Price and Quality Competition].
80. Professional self-regulation that restricts private advertising may also be justified as
a response to technical complexity, patient vulnerability, and similar factors that heighten
the risk of misleading the public. Unlike direct government regulation, however, collective
private activity must survive antitrust scrutiny. Compare Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 377
(1977) (finding ban on price advertising anticompetitive), with California Dental Ass'n v.
FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604, 1617-18 (1999) (holding "quick look" analysis of advertising restric-
tions inappropriate).
81. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS IN-
STRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 13-28, 137-53 (1995) (criticizing the current
underutilization of contracts as a means of privately allocating health care resources and
advocating a greater role for contracts as a means of effectuating health care choices); Mark
A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L.
REv. 1637, 1651-62 (1992) (examining the judicial tendency to decide coverage cases in
favor of the insured and exploring the social costs involved in precluding these types of
private ex ante commitments).
82. See Sage, Regulating Through Information, supra note 77, at 1716-23.
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C. Agency Issues and Purchasing Power
In part because of information problems, but also as the result
of risk-pooling and the complexity of producing health services,
patients rely on a series of agents and intermediaries in purchasing
health coverage, including health care professionals, insurers, em-
ployers, and government. The organization of purchasing power
creates opportunities and dangers for non-price competition.
Many health care purchasing decisions are aggregated above the
level of the individual consumer. Employers often arrange for the
health care benefits of their employees. Private third-party payers
increasingly engage in selective contracting and negotiate rates of
compensation and terms of service on behalf of their insureds.
Perhaps most significantly, the federal Medicare program pays for
approximately one-fifth of all medical services supplied in the
country."
A competition policy predicated upon sophisticated group pur-
chasing is likely to be more effective than a competition policy
predicated on decentralized individual decisions. Pooling consum-
ers into large groups counteracts a number of the incentive and
information problems facing individual patients. While the indi-
vidual patient is unlikely to act as the perfectly informed consumer
assumed in neoclassical economic models, a purchasing coopera-
tive or an employer purchasing on behalf of its employees is
capable of making consistent, rational choices. Collective purchas-
ers may also internalize enough of the benefits of investing in
information to justify the expense, and collective purchasers can
gather information more cheaply over time by learning from the
experiences of the entire covered population. Finally, groups of
private purchasers can collectively assess and measure quality at-
tributes, as is occurring through National Committee for Quality
Assurance ("NCQA") accreditation and the newly constituted Na-
tional Forum for Health Care Quality Measurement and
Reporting. 
4
At the same time, the proliferation of intermediaries creates a
variety of agency problems. At the individual level, providers do
83. See Sheila Smith et al., The Next Ten Years of Health Spending: What Does the Future
Hold?, HEALTH AFa., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 128, 129.
84. See John K. Iglehart, The National Committee for Quality Assurance, 335 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 995, 995-99 (1996) (explaining the background, purpose, and function of the
NCQA); Tracy Miller & Sheila Leatherman, The National Quality Forum: A "Me-Too" or a Break-
through in Quality Measurement and Reporting?, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 233
(describing the organization and mission of the Health Care Quality Forum).
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not truly stand in the shoes of patients. At the collective level, em-
ployers and insurers may incompletely aggregate or convey the
preferences of plan beneficiaries; and trustees of community hos-
pitals may not fully represent communities themselves. Agency
relationships can reduce price competition and impair efficiency
by presenting opportunities for self-dealing. But their influence on
non-price issues and price-quality tradeoffs can be even greater, if
not so insidious.5 All of these interactions, and their regulation
through contractual or fiduciary oversight, affect quality competi-
tion by filtering underlying preferences. Predictably, courts have
been unclear, and sometimes uneasy, about the identity of the
health care "consumer." In California Dental Ass'n, for example,
even Justice Breyer's strongly pro-competition dissent equated
"consumer" with "patient," and failed to grasp the importance of
purchasing intermediaries to effective competition. 6
Furthermore, antitrust law tends to treat buyers more leniently
than sellers.8 ' Deference to purchasers can be problematic when
buyers are agents who re-sell to end users. This fact has not gone
unnoticed. Most-favored-customer clauses in large health insurers'
contracts with providers are coming under increased scrutiny be-
cause of concerns over barriers to competitive entry at the insurer
level."8 Concentration of economic power on the purchasing side
85. Although discussions of physician agency usually emphasize the importance of pa-
tient autonomy and the danger of financial conflicts of interest, the physician-patient
relationship and the physician's role in society are complex. See generally CARL E. SCHNEIDER,
THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND MEDICAL DECISIONS (1998)
(critiquing simplistic views of autonomy); William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35 Hous.
L. REv. 1529 (1999) (arguing that physicians cannot be patient advocates in a lawyer's sense
of the term).
86. See California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604, 1623 (1999) (claiming that
.consumers are relatively indifferent" to the opportunity for insurers to review the necessity
of treatment); see also FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1299-1300 (W.D.
Mich. 1996), aff'd without opinion 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir.), reported inful, 1997-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 71,863 (6th Cir. 1997) (questioning whether managed care organizations were
"consumers" for the purpose of antitrust analysis).
87. See, e.g., Kartell v. Blue Shield, Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 927-29 (1st Cir. 1984)
(upholding fixed prices for physician services by a state's largest insurer on the grounds that
it constituted rational purchasing). For a general discussion of the antitrust issues raised by
cooperative buying in health care markets, see Clark C. Havighurst, Antitrust Issues in the Joint
Purchasing of Health Care, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 409.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Delta Dental, 943 F. Supp. 172 (D.R.I. 1996) (denying
Delta Dental's motion to dismiss and holding that the government's complaint alleging that
Delta Dental's most-favored-customer clause constituted an unlawful restraint on trade
stated a valid cause of action). But see Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic,
65 F.3d 1406, 1415 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding most-favored-customer clauses as "standard
devices by which buyers to try bargain for low prices"). See also Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical
Restraints with Horizontal Consequences: Competitive Effects of "Most-Favored-Customer" Clauses, 64
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(monopsony power) is an additional concern. The model of per-
fect competition not only assumes that the number of sellers is so
large that the actions of individual producers are unable to affect
market price, it imposes similar limitations on the influence of
buyers. Consumer monopsony can lead to economic distortions
similar to those of producer monopoly. A monopsonist facing
competitive suppliers will ordinarily depress input prices, which
will cause a suboptimal level of production. 9
The fact that the largest health care purchaser in the country is
a public entity raises issues of political science, as well as econom-
ics. g Despite its size, Medicare has seldom if ever acted as a
monopsonist.' Health care providers have substantial input into
federal regulatory and policymaking processes, and regulatory cap-
ture by physician and hospital lobbies-often rationalized by those
providers as necessary to cross-subsidize charity care-explains
many of Medicare's early practices. For example, generous physi-
cian payment based on "usual, customary, and reasonable" fees, as
well as a promise that government would not interfere with clinical
decisions, were part of Medicare's original political bargain in
ANTITRUST L.J. 517 (1996) (examining the reasons why some most-favored-customers
clauses may have anticompetitive effects).
89. For discussions of the general economic effects of monopsony, see HOVENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 3, at 14-16; Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison,
Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 297, 301-06 (1991); Roger D. Blair &
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Public Policy: Cooperative Buying, Monopsony Power, and Antitrust Policy, 86
Nw. U. L. REV. 331, 334-36 (1992). For an examination of how courts have dealt with the
issue of monopsony power in health care markets, see Andrew Ruskin, Unbridled Managed
Care: When Consumers Experience Antitrust Welfare Loss from Exclusionary Contracts Between HMO
Insurers and Health Care Providers, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 391, 457-60 (1996). Interestingly, the
welfare implications of a monopsonist facing a monopolist (an example of countervailing
economic power) are often indeterminate. See PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTI-
TRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 173 n.27, 200 n.51 (5th ed. 1997). A
monopsonist confronting sellers with market power may or may not lead to a strictly less
efficient set of prices and output.
90. See generally Bruce C. Vladeck, The Political Economy of Medicare, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-
Feb. 1999, at 22 (examining the political economy of Medicare in terms of redistributive,
interest-group, and distributive politics).
91. Even in the market for kidney dialysis, where Medicare is a true "single-payer," it
has been unusually generous in fees and policies. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COM-
MISSION, supra note 8, at 130-34 (recommending increases in payment for outpatient
dialysis services); Norman G. Levinsky & Richard A. Rettig, The Medicare End-Stage Renal Dis-
ease Program: A Report from the Institute of Medicine, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1143, 1148 (1991)
(recommending continued payment increases to account for the effects of inflation). By
contrast, physician payment under Medicaid, the joint federal-state health insurance pro-
gram for the indigent, has been so consistently below market levels that many physicians
limit or refuse Medicaid patients, which is easier for most to do than would be the case with
Medicare patients.
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1965,92 and have taken decades to erode. Hospitals were paid on a
cost-plus basis, with separate capital cost reimbursement and other
add-ons, for most of the first two decades of Medicare's existence.
Furthermore, Medicare was designed to replicate private insurance
arrangements, and therefore allows private subcontractors, called
intermediaries (in Medicare Part A) and carriers (in Part B), sub-
stantial discretion when making coverage and payment decisions,
which arguably undercuts the solidarity of its purchasing deci-
sions.93
In recent years, rapid growth in program expenditures com-
bined with cost constraints in public budgets and the long-term
prospect of an aging population have helped Medicare regain cost-
consciousness.94 Prospective payment for hospitals under the DRG
program, rationalized reimbursement of physicians under RBRVS,
risk-adjusted payment to Medicare HMOs, and aggressive investiga-
tion and prosecution of perceived fraud and abuse are the primary
weapons of today's Medicare cost-cutters. 95 One can only hope that
these important but narrow perspectives can give way to a broader
vision of competition as a vehicle to restructure Medicare and
medical markets.
There are a number of creative possibilities. Medicare policies
and regulations could help facilitate more competitive practices
industry-wide. 96 The government might consciously exercise influ-
ence and control through its monopsony power in lieu of more
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(b), (f) (1982). A telling statistic is that physician fees in the
first three years of the Medicare program-1965, 1966, and 1967-rose at a sharply greater
rate compared to the Consumer Price Index than at any previous time, suggesting that what
was "usual and customary" depended on who was paying the bills. See William M. Sage, Drug
Product Liability and Health Care Delivery Systems, 40 STAN. L. REV. 989, 997 n.41 (1988).
93. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. T-PEMD-94-17, MEDICARE PART
B: INCONSISTENT DENIAL RATES FOR MEDICAL NECESSITY ACROSS Six CARRIERS 13-14
(1994).
94. See Charles N. Kahn III & Hanns Kutmer, Budget Bills and Medicare Polity: The Politics
of the BBA, HEALTH AF., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 37.
95. Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) pay hospitals a fixed amount for each admission
based on the patient's diagnosis rather than reimbursing billed charges for each service
rendered, while the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS) ties physician payment to
a schedule based on time, intensity, and other objective factors, rather than customary fees.
See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 844-61 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing Medicare pay-
ment methodologies); John K. Iglehart, Interuiew--Bringing Forth Medicare+Choice: HCFA's
Robert A. Berenson, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 144 (outlining current Medicare payment
policies and exploring issues raised by Medicare's experiments with managed care models).
96. For example, the Clinton administration recently announced a proposal for Medi-
care restructuring that would implement competitive bidding in both fee-for-service and
managed care Medicare, and otherwise look to market mechanisms to obtain savings. See
Robert Pear, Clinton Lays Out Plan to Overhaul Medicare System, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1999, at
Al; see also Robert Pear, Clinton Proposes a Discount System on Medicare Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
18, 1999, atAl.
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traditional forms of regulation. The Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration might more actively cooperate with DOJ and FTC in
the formation and implementation of a competition policy. Finally,
the political debates over the future of Medicare might provide a
forum for establishing some of the allocative efficiency bench-
marks normally provided by a well-functioning market, such as
identifying appropriate ranges of price/quality and quality/quality
tradeoffs, as well as defining goals for total system performance.
D. Effects of Insurance
The prevalence of private insurance is a defining characteristic
of health care markets and has been for the past 50 years. Private
insurance introduces a number of complicating factors for com-
petitive analysis. Insurance raises problems of moral hazard by
insulating consumers from the costs of their consumption deci-
sions. In addition, insurance forces price/quality tradeoffs to be
made far in advance of illness. Insurance also may limit product
differentiation because of concerns about adverse selection.
97
As with information market failure, regulation enacted in re-
sponse to insurance can influence competition as much as
insurance itself. Understanding the competitive implications of
insurance regulation presents a challenge. To begin with, numer-
ous actors are involved. The sale of insurance is regulated by
separate insurance departments in each of the fifty states.9 s The
federal government has insulated self-insured ERISA plans from
this patchwork system of regulation,99 introducing questions of
97. Certain quality attributes may selectively attract higher-risk individuals, reducing
profit in insurance pools where products cannot be costlessly repriced. The ability of insur-
ers to manipulate benefit design in order to attract favorable risk pools is well-established.
Compulsory sports medicine benefits and other features that are used only by those who
lead active lifestyles will not appeal to the chronically ill. Even pre-packaged dental coverage
can have a risk-selecting purpose, because people with teeth tend to be younger and health-
ier than those without. Conversely, hospitals that have developed high-quality AIDS units
and other costly services may not advertise those services aggressively for fear of having their
prepaid products (or charitable reserves) overwhelmed by high-risk patients.
98. See Allison Overbay & Mark Hall, Insurance Regulation of Providers That Bear Risk, 22
Am. J.L. & MED. 361, 379-83 (1996) (discussing system of state regulation of medical insur-
ance).
99. See id. at 379-83 (discussing federal ERISA preemption of state health insurance
regulation).
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state and federal relations into the discussion.00 Lurking in the
background is the longstanding McCarran-Ferguson exemption
from federal antitrust laws for the business of insurance.101
Complicating issues is the threshold question of whether HMOs
and other organizations that arrange prepaid health care are en-
gaged in the business of insurance. For example, must a physician
group offering its services on a capitated basis comply with insur-
ance regulation?02 States have taken varying positions, as has the
federal government, with respect to physician networks contracting
for Medicare business.03
The integration of health care financing with delivery of services
that defines managed care magnifies the competitive importance
of insurance regulation. A cornerstone of insurance regulation is
protection of carrier solvency, so that funds are available to pay
claims. 4 However, the principal devices used to accomplish this
may be in tension with efforts to provide consumers maximum
choice and to cultivate effective competition in the provision of
medical services.0 5 For example, rate regulation prevents price dis-
counting, high reserve requirements create barriers to market
entry for new competitors, and guaranty funds may encourage risk-
taking by assuring a bailout package if risks materialize.
Moreover, health care organizations that bear insurance risk as
well as provide services can "compete" on either basis. For exam-
ple, an insurance policy that is "medically underwritten," meaning
that its price, scope, and availability are based on the health of the
potential enrollee, can be a smart purchase for a healthy individual
100. See generally Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Care:
The Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251 (1997) (discussing the federalism
questions raised by federal and state actions in health care).
101. See generally authorities cited supra note 68.
102. See Overbay & Hall, supra note 98, at 383-86 (summarizing state approaches to the
regulation of provider groups assuming financial risk for managed care business); see also
Margo P. Kelly, State Insurance Regulation of Provider-Sponsored Organizations, HEALTHCARE FIN.
MGMT.,JUly 1997, at 44, 44-46 (same).
103. In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress established the Medicare+Choice
Program. See Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (1998)). Among other things, the program establishes a process under
which provider-sponsored organizations can apply to the Department of Health and Human
Services for a "waiver" of state insurance licensing requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-25(2)
(1998). For a discussion of the Medicare+Choice Program and a summary of its waiver provi-
sions, see James J. Unland, The Range of Provider/Insurer Configurations, J. HEALTH CARE FIN.,
Winter 1998, at 1, 3-5.
104. See id. at 89-90.
105. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw 85 (2d ed. 1996)
("[T]he larger objectives of insurance regulation are to prevent destructive competition,
compensate for inadequate information, relieve unequal bargaining power, and assist con-
sumers incapable of rationally acting in their best interests.").
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and an effective safeguard against adverse selection for the in-
surer.0 6 However, if one believes that the major objective of
competition in health care should be to reduce inefficiencies in
health care delivery, it becomes problematic that "competing"
health plans may prosper just as easily by carefully selecting health-
ier enrollees as by improving the services they provide.1
7
In addition, differentiated insurance packages that offer a wide
range of choices with respect to price and scope of coverage con-
flict with regulatory policies favoring access to affordable health
insurance through "community rating."'' s If one believes that the
implicit subsidy of the sick by the healthy is desirable, then one
would oppose greater product differentiation in insurance mar-
kets.100 This discussion is further complicated by the fact that there
may be some level of differentiation below which the risk pools
necessary to maintain a workable insurance market would them-
selves be threatened."l0
Insurance therefore raises difficult but not intractable problems
for competition, most of which consist of grasping interconnec-
tions among relevant issues. Rather than make decisions regarding
insurance regulation in isolation, an effective competition policy
would seek to make policies affecting the insurance aspects of
medical services with a clear sense of broader competitive and
health care goals.
106. See id. at 429.
107. Recent attention has focused on governmental "risk-adjustment" of premium pay-
ments to blunt insurer incentives to select risks while preserving competition on the basis of
service provision. However, the technical feasibility of this approach is still open to question.
See Sandra Shewry et al., Risk Adjustment: The Missing Piece of Market Competition, HEALTH AFF.,
Spring 1996, at 171, 173-79 (examining the risk adjustment efforts of the Health Insurance
Plan of California (HIPC)).
108. SeeJERRY, supra note 105, at 424-29; see also Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the
Soul of Health Insurance, 18J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 287 (1993) (distinguishing social soli-
darity visions of insurance from private risk-reduction).
109. For an extensive discussion of the distributional concerns raised by increased use
of risk-based insurance pricing, see GLIED, supra note 7, at 122-56, which examines how
different insurance pricing practices accomplish redistribution from the healthy to the sick,
the young to the old, and the rich to the poor.
110. New York state's community rating law has not resulted in the adverse selection
"death spiral" and massive uninsurance predicted by its critics, but younger, healthier indi-
viduals have shifted from generous, indemnity-based insurance products to more restrictive
HMOs. See THOMAS BUCHMUELLER &JOHN DINARDO, DID COMMUNITY RATING INDUCE AN
ADVERSE SELECTION DEATH SPIRAL: EVIDENCE FROM NEW YORK, PENNSYLVANIA, AND CON-
NECTICUT (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6872, 1999).
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E. The Relationship Between Market Structure
and Market Outcome
Traditional antitrust policy is predicated on the assumption that
market power (as measured by market share) is associated with
higher prices and lower levels of quality. This belief, together with
the assumption that competitive markets provide the appropriate
benchmark for establishing efficient price/quality and qual-
ity/quality determinations, justifies many common antitrust
prohibitions: mergers creating excessive levels of economic con-
centration; monopoly power used in a predatory or exclusionary
manner; and agreements between horizontal competitors that in-
terfere with independent determinations of price, territory, and
product characteristics. " ' Antitrust policy becomes indeterminate if
it is unclear either what types of price/quality and quality/quality
tradeoffs are desirable, or what effect different market structures
will have on price and quality outcomes.
In health care, it is difficult to make predictions about the ef-
fects of market power and competition on variables such as price,
quality, and variety. As stated earlier, under different sets of as-
sumptions, credible scenarios can be constructed where
competition in health care markets can provide too much (or lit-
tle) quality and/or too much (or little) product differentiation."
3
When price is fixed and firms compete exclusively in terms of qual-
ity, a race model is likely to dominate where firms provide high but
uniform levels of quality." 4 By contrast, when firms compete in
terms of both price and quality, a range of different price/quality
115
combinations is likely to emerge.
111. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (outlining antitrust rules and prohibi-
tions).
112. Cf supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (outlining the basic monopoly-
Cournot-perfect competition framework with its unambiguous predictions for antitrust
policy). Even without considering quality, the relationship between market power and
allocative efficiency is more complex in health care than in many other sectors. For
example, one can debate whether reduced output from seller monopoly in health care may
be efficiency-enhancing if it counteracts overuse of services resulting from insurance. See
Martin Gaynor et al., Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the
Second Best in Health Care Markets (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
6865, 1998) (concluding that competitive insurance markets would check any such effect
from imperfectly competitive health care markets). Factoring in non-price considerations,
however, makes this type of generalization even more suspect.
113. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing the indeterminate welfare
effects of product differentiation).
114. See Hammer, Price and Quality Competition, supra note 79, at 132-33.
115. See id. at 126 ("Traditional markets are characterized by minimal price competi-
tion, which has the effect of encouraging intense non-price competition but minimal quality
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Competition under traditional systems of fee-for-service
reimbursement coupled with passive third-party payment arguably
produced more quality competition than was socially desirable. '1 6
Ironically, while yielding excessive levels of vertical quality, these
same economic forces unduly restricted the range of horizontal
quality differentiation and consumer choice. Under modern
systems of pre-payment, however, competition focusing pre-
dominantly on price may result in suboptimal levels of quality
because of information asymmetries, agency issues, and similar
considerations. The fact that alternative economic models can be
constructed to contradict many of the above scenarios serves only
to underscore the radical nature of the indeterminacy once the
anchors of the simple monopoly-Cournot-perfect competition
framework are abandoned."7
Modeling the market structure-market outcome relationship will
require a more complete understanding of the types of strategic
interaction that are taking place in health care markets. Different
economic models make different assumptions about how market
players interact. Not surprisingly, these models provide very
different predictions about the impact of market structure on
considerations such as price, quantity, and quality. For example,
the classic Cournot model assumes that firms independently and
simultaneously select the level of output each will produce,
operating under the belief that their actions will have no impact on
the equilibrium actions of their competitors."" In the end, the
differentiation; whereas emerging health care markets create the opportunity for active price
competition, which will result in less intense incentives for non-price competition but greater
levels of quality differentiation.").
116. See Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions, supra note 16 (discussing
the economic factors motivating non-price competition in traditional health care markets).
For surveys of studies examining the relationship between non-price competition and mar-
ket structure, see Frederic J. Entin et al., Hospital Collaboration: The Need for an Appropriate
Antitrust Policy, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 107, 153-67 (1994); Paul A. Pautler & Michael G.
Vita, Hospital Market Structure, Hospital Competition and Consumer Welfare: hat Can the Evidence
Tell Us?, 10J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 117 (1994); PeterJ. Hammer, Mergers, Market
Power and Competition: An Economic and Legal Evaluation of Hospital Mergers 22-27
(1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Hammer, Mergers, Market Power & Competition]; see also supra notes 6-7 and
accompanying text (discussing non-price competition in traditional health care markets).
117. For example, if one focuses on product differentiation, there are scenarios where
market power can lead a monopolist to provide either too great (or too limited) a range of
price/quality and quality/quality combinations. See generally Eytan Sheshinski, Price, Quality
and Quantity Regulation in Monopoly Situations, 43 ECONOMICA 127 (1976); A. Michael Spence,
Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL.J. ECoN. 417 (1975).
1.18. See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 3, at 152-54; KREPS, MI-
CROECONOMICS, supra note 35, at 326-28; JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 217-21 (1988); VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE, supra note 35, at 447-58. For a dis-
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aggregate level of industry output determines the market price.
The Bertrand model of price competition, on the other hand,
assumes that firms independently and simultaneously submit price
bids and that market demand is allocated to the lowest bidder, who
is then obligated to supply the entire quantity demanded at the
winning price." 9 The Cournot model predicts that industry price
and profits will ultimately be determined by the number of firms in
the industry-larger numbers of firms will be associated with lower
prices and higher levels of output. The Bertrand model, on the
other hand, predicts that as few as two firms can produce a price-
equals-marginal-cost "competitive" equilibrium, so long as each
firm has the capacity to supply the entire market.20
If market interaction fits well into the Cournot model, then anti-
trust policy should focus on market shares and economic
concentration as a means of producing lower prices and higher
levels of output. This is descriptive of most contemporary antitrust
policy and doctrine.12 ' If market interaction fits into a Bertrand
model, however, then antitrust law and policy should be more con-
cerned about rules preserving the integrity of the bidding process.
Instead of focusing on market share as an indication of market
power, moreover, analysis should focus on the existence of produc-
tive capacity sufficient to make a bidding model work.
22
Some forms of quality competition can be modeled in a frame-
work that is very similar to the Cournot price/quantity model. A
cussion of the Cournot model in the context of hospital competition, see Hammer, Medical
Antitrust Reform, supra note 66, at 38-40.
119. See KREPS, MICROECONOMICS, supra note 35, at 330-35; TIROLE, supra note 118, at
209-12; VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE, supra note 35, at 461-62. For a discussion of the Bertrand
model in the context of hospital competition, see Hammer, Medical Antitrust Reform, supra
note 66, at 38.
120. See Hammer, Medical Antitrust Reform, supra note 66, at 38. Excess capacity is an es-
sential assumption of the Bertrand model, and can be realistically applied to many health
care markets in the short term. In fact, much of the success of managed care in containing
costs can be attributed to aggressive negotiation of price-volume tradeoffs in connection
with selective contracting, something that could only occur because of an abundance of
hopitals and physicians. Whether redundant capacity is sensible over the long term is an
important policy question. For discussion of inventory theory in health care, see Linda U.
Green & Vizh Nguyen, Strategies for Cutting Hospital Beds: The Impact on Patient Service, 35
HEALTH SERV. REs. (forthcoming 2000) (examining the impact of size, variability in length
of stay, demand, and other factors on delays in the availability of hospital beds).
121. See Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions, supra note 16 (discussing
reliance of antitrust law on categorical rules and market share presumptions).
122. See Hammer, Mergers, Market Power & Competition, supra note 116, at 300-01
(exploring the concept of Bertrand market power in the context of hospitals bidding for
selective contracts); see also Richard N. Langlois, Contract, Competition, and Efficiency, 55
BROOKLYN L. REV. 831, 839-42 (1989) (arguing that market power should be understood
not in terms of the structural model of perfect or Cournot competition, but rather in terms
of transaction costs and as a problem of private ordering).
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model of Cournot-type vertical quality competition under condi-
tions of fixed price can be developed that is symmetrical to the
traditional model of Cournot price/quantity competition under
conditions of fixed quality.123 This model establishes a link between
market structure and the intensity of non-price competition: the
more diffuse the market, the greater the level of quality; con-
versely, the more concentrated the market, the lower the level of
quality that will be provided. While this model is able to salvage the
market structure linkage assumed by antitrust law, it is unable (by
itself) to establish the efficiency of the resulting equilibrium. Com-
petition in this model may still provide too much or too little
quality. 124 Alone, the model is unable to provide clear policy rec-
ommendations. Instead, courts and policymakers need a new
framework with which to analyze the implications of various market
structures on quality, and therefore to understand the welfare im-
pact of proposed market changes.
12
5
As applied to health care markets, it is important to determine
the appropriate range of strategic variables with which market par-
ticipants compete. This can be accomplished by finding answers to
the following empirical questions: Are providers making strategic
decisions regarding productive capacity and level of output? Are
providers competing in terms of price? Is price competition mani-
fested in terms of competitive bidding? Are providers competing in
terms of the quality of services provided? Do providers compete in
terms of efforts to provide greater absolute levels of particular
123. See Hammer, Mergers, Market Power & Competition, supra note 116, at 103-18
(developing an economic model of hospital non-price competition in traditionally struc-
tured health care markets).
124. Most of the models of non-price competition in the economics literature use re-
duced form demand functions, where the non-price variable simply appears as an argument
in the demand function that has the effect of increasing either market or firm-specific de-
mand. These demand functions are not derived from consumer utility and therefore cannot
be employed to assess relative consumer valuations of the non-price attribute. See Hammer,
Mergers, Market Power & Competition, supra note 116, at 90-91; TIROLE, supra note 118, at
102-04.
125. Although not developed in the literature, one can envision a Bertrand-type model
of non-price competition under conditions of fixed prices. Two producers with capacity to
supply the entire market would submit bids identifying the quality levels at which each
would sell. Buyers would select the highest quality offered and sellers would be required to
honor their bids. In equilibrium, both sellers would bid a level of quality such that their
marginal costs (inclusive of the quality component) would equal the fixed price. Again,
under the restrictive Bertrand assumptions, as few as two producers would be able to dupli-
cate the competitive non-price equilibrium identified by George Stigler. See Stigler, supra
note 9. Non-price competition in this model functions to transform producer surplus into
consumer surplus in the form of higher quality. This scenario corresponds to forms of non-
price competition observed in some Medicare managed care markets. See discussion supra
note 7.
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quality considerations, or do providers compete in terms of offer-
ing consciously different arrays of quality attributes or
price/quality combinations? After the range of strategic variables is
identified, is it necessary to ask whether providers operate inde-
pendently or cooperatively? Are all providers roughly the same
size? Are there identifiable patterns of leader/follower behavior?
What types of events trigger changes in market price and quality
offerings?
Public purchasers have grappled with many of these questions as
they assess the pros and cons of competitive bidding models for
managed care, either by allowing single contractors to serve all
beneficiaries, or by encouraging broad participation but paying a
fixed premium derived from the amounts bid. For example,
California's transition plan to mandatory managed care for its
Medi-Cal program solicited county-wide bids, but allowed
beneficiaries a choice between the lowest commercial bidder and a
"local initiative" of non-profit community providers. 126 Against
continued political opposition, Medicare is launching its third pilot
project involving competitive bids, with HMOs receiving from the
Health Care Financing Administration a median or weighted
average of the bids received and either providing extra benefits or
charging enrollees higher premiums to the extent their bids
diverge from the government's contribution.
12
1
Many considerations come into play in making these decisions.
High turnover in health plan membership at annual enrollment
periods can have adverse consequences for patients in terms of
continuity of care, and can significantly dilute incentives for health
plans to invest in preventive care or early treatment. Moreover, es-
tablished organizations often entrench themselves economically
and politically, commanding supracompetitive prices and imposing
large exit costs on the system. These problems could be substan-
tially reduced by an improved bidding structure. Redundant
capacity is a related concern, the desirability of which can vary ac-
cording to the competitive model that is adopted. Excess capacity
can be viewed as either an inefficient waste of resources, or as an
126. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. HEHS-95-87, MEDICAID MAN-
AGED CARE: MORE COMPETITION AND OVERSIGHT WOULD IMPROVE CALIFORNIA'S
EXPANSION PLAN (1995) (outlining California's plan to make its Medi-Cal program manda-
tory to reduce unnecessary services and increase efficiency of care).
127. See Geri Aston, Groups Fight Medicare HMO Pricing Project, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 13,
1999, at 1. As noted above, the Clinton administration recently proposed competitive bid-
ding for fee-for-service Medicare as well, particularly in connection with technologically
sophisticated procedures that may be more effective when performed in experienced insti-
tutions. See Pear, supra note 96.
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essential component for making bidding models work effectively.
Among other things, capacity is important to society because of the
potential for public emergencies and the fact that nearly twenty
percent of Americans lack health insurance and depend on charity
care in cases of significant illness.
128
F. Innovation and Dynamic Efficiency
There are tensions between static and dynamic understandings
of efficiency. Antitrust law not only assumes that competitive mar-
kets will be allocatively efficient, but that innovation and the
dissemination of new productive technologies are best mediated
through decentralized, non-cooperative, profit-motivated private
interaction. Static economic models assume a well-defined set of
existing production possibilities. The nature of technological
change, however, is to redefine these possibilities, which will neces-
sarily engender a new market equilibrium. A competition policy in
health care, as in other regulated industries where technology mat-
ters, requires a structured approach to innovation as a quality
concern.
Although categories will blur on the edges, it is useful to distin-
guish among (i) the introduction of completely new health care
technology; (ii) the introduction of a new way of arranging service
provision given existing health care technology (e.g., a new prac-
tice protocol or a new combination of physician and non-physician
services); and (iii) the introduction of a new organizational form
or contractual arrangement for the delivery of health care services
(a change in the underlying makeup of the firm such as the inte-
gration of financing and delivery of services). Innovations are
taking place in each of these categories. Some can be evaluated
within a traditional partial equilibrium framework, as suggested by
Oliver Williamson. 2 9 Williamson postulated a change in technology
that substantially enhances productive efficiency but necessitates
the restructuring of the industry into a monopoly. 13 0 To assess the
128. See Robert Pear, Government Lags in Steps to Widen Health Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
9, 1998, at Al (noting that since 1992 the number of uninsured rose from 37 million to 41
million, despite a prolonged period of economic prosperity).
129. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-
offs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 18 (1968) [hereinafter Williamson, Welfare Tradeoffs]; Oliver E.
Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 699 (1977)
[hereinafter Williamson, Economies Revisited].
130. See Williamson, Welfare Tradeoffs, supra note 129, at 21-23; Williamson, Ekonomies
Revisited, supra note 129, at 706-09.
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desirability of such changes, he proposed balancing the dead-
weight loss of monopoly (reductions in allocative efficiency)
against the increased productive efficiency stemming from the new
technology. Unfortunately, other aspects of dynamic efficiency are
less amenable to partial equilibrium analysis. "Adaptability," for
example, is often a desirable institutional trait, but is not a charac-
teristic that fits neatly into an evaluative framework."s Still,
assessing the capacity of different systems to respond over time to a
changing health care environment should play an important part
in striking the balance between market and non-market institu-
tions.
Some lessons can be learned from other industries. In 1998, for
example, the only two remaining large American defense
contractors called off their proposed merger in light of continued
opposition from DOJ. 13 2 Although the companies argued that a
defense monopoly could not affect price or compliance with
design specifications, since both were set by the federal
government, DOJ remained concerned that the merged company
would have less incentive to innovate than would two competitive
enterprises. 13 3 This situation has parallels in health care, which is
also characterized by large government purchasers and
administrative pricing. Similarly, a dynamic view of quality can
affect assessments of appropriate price-quality tradeoffs. Health
care providers frequently argue that high levels of reimbursement
are necessary to protect quality of care. However, experience in the
airline industry shows that setting high prices through regulation
does not necessarily guarantee higher quality if one considers the
potential for organizational innovation. When fares and routes
were deregulated in the late 1970s, competition led carriers to
131. See Hammer, Price and Quality Competition, supra note 79, at 140-41 (discussing im-
portance of "adaptability" as a concern in choosing between the market paradigm and the
professional paradigm in emerging health care markets).
132. See Damian Kemp, Lockheed Martin Quits Merger Bid After Opposition, JANE'S DEFENCE
WEEKLY, July 22, 1998, at 4 (referring to DOJ's commitment to pursue legal action if Lock-
heed Martin followed through with its $8.3 billion planned purchase of Northrop
Grumann).
133. The DOJ challenged the proposed merger between Lockheed Martin and North-
rop Grumman largely due to the perceived effect of the merger on subsequent research and
development. See Press Conference with Attorney GeneralJanet Reno and Secretary of Defense William
Cohen, FED. NEws SERV., Mar. 23, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Federal News Serv-
ice File (quoting the Attorney General: "[i]t would cost taxpayers more and take the
competitive wind out of the sails of innovation in the production of many critical systems
that protect our fighting men and women around the world."). For a discussion of innova-
tion markets more generally and of issues raised in earlier defense industry mergers, see
Lawrence B. Landman, Did Congress Actually Create Innovation Markets?, 13 BERKELEY TECH.
LJ. 721, 794-95 (1998).
SUMMER 1999] 1105
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
reorganize into "hub-and-spoke" systems that were much more
cost-effective than traditional point-to-point service, and allowed
more frequent departure times. 134 Antitrust enforcement agencies
and the architects of any competition policy in health care markets
must be sensitive to these types of concerns.
G. Welfare Analysis and Non-Economic Objectives
In light of the redistributive potential of various competitive out-
comes, and the social imperatives underlying health policy, it is
important to specify in greater detail than is typical in antitrust cases
the metric for welfare analysis that should be used. Two distinct sets
of questions are raised. First, what welfare standard should antitrust
courts adopt to evaluate the competitive effects of alleged restraints
of trade? Second, what welfare standard should policymakers assert
in structuring a competition policy that defines the boundaries be-
tween market and non-market institutions and mediates between
economic and non-economic objectives in health care?
The welfare standard antitrust courts employ is not always clear.1 3 5
Many courts believe that the purpose of antitrust law is to maximize
some vision of consumer surplus, 36 meaning that efficiency gains
from mergers are recognized only if they are passed on to consumers
and that other benefits are legitimate only to the extent that paying
customers value them. 37 A total welfare standard, by contrast, would
permit antitrust courts to consider a broader range of economic fac-
tors, such as the potential for practices to increase producer surplus
(profits), or the social gains that can be derived from diverting re-
sources out of health care and into higher-valued sectors of the
economy (improved allocative efficiency) .35
134. See W. Kip VIsCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 583-86
(1995) (arguing that the hub-and-spoke system has increased airline quality, but acknowl-
edging that the increased number of flight departure times must be balanced against longer
travel times and an increased number of transfers).
135. For a discussion of the confusion that exists in contemporary antitrust law over the
appropriate welfare standard, see Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions,
supra note 16.
136. "Consumer surplus" represents the difference between what individual consumers
would be willing to pay for a product or service and the amount that they actually do pay.
When prices are raised and consumers are forced to pay more, there is a reduction in con-
sumer surplus. For a more detailed discussion of consumer surplus in antitrust cases, see id.
137. See id. (discussing the "passing on" requirement in merger cases).
138. Total welfare represents the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus
(profits). A total welfare standard would permit any merger or restraint of trade that re-
sulted in a net increase in total welfare. Theoretically, this would include situations where a
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Some critics would argue that even the broader total welfare
antitrust standard is overly restrictive in scope. A total welfare
standard is still limited to economic considerations-non-economic
social values carry no doctrinal weight. 9 Nonetheless, openly
noncompetitive priorities exist in health care with respect to equality
of access to services, and social responsibility for the causes and
consequences of illness.4 0 For example, health care experts may
well contend that certain conduct that might otherwise be
considered "anticompetitive" might still be socially beneficial
because it supports the cross-subsidization of care for the
uninsured or otherwise helps fulfill the equitable obligations of the
medical profession, non-profit health facilities, and society as a
whole, even if those benefits do not flow directly to consumers.141
Although one could invoke older antitrust theories for support of a
potentially broad range of non-economic goals that antitrust laws
could pursue, such claims do not find a comfortable home under
contemporary doctrine.
Developing a welfare standard that permits discussion of
conflicting economic and non-economic objectives in health care
will be an essential component of establishing a suitable
competition policy. 142 Among other things, how these tensions are
resolved will help define the boundaries of the health care
merger lead to a reduction in consumer surplus, so long as the reduction in consumer sur-
plus was more than offset by the increase in producer profits. A total welfare standard would
not require the benefits of merger to be "passed on" to consumers. For a more detailed
discussion of the total welfare standard in antitrust cases see id.
139. See id. (contrasting the intra-economic focus of the total welfare standard with pos-
sible regimes of extra-economic analysis and arguing that antitrust law should be limited to
an intra-economic orientation).
140. More general arguments are resurfacing that the health care system is incapable of
fulfilling its greater social goals through competitive processes. See THOMAS RICE, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF HEALTH REcONSIDERED 22-54 (1998) (detailing problems with the market
theory of competition and its implications for health policy). For example, the U.S. lags
many developed nations in basic health indicators such as life expectancy and infant mortal-
ity, even though it spends a much higher percentage of GDP on health care. See GLIED, supra
note 7, at 92-93 (observing that only in life expectancy at age 80 does America's technologic
capacity yield clear public health dividends). Any attempt to redirect the market from gen-
erating medical care to generating actual health would require a nonmarket framework.
141 Some physicians question the notion that "consumer" is an appropriate label for
patients, maintaining instead that provision of care should be determined by professional
medical assessment of therapeutic benefit, which would preclude many price/quality trade-
offs entirely. See David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, A National Health Program for
the United States: A Physician's Proposal, 320 NEw ENG.J. MED. 102, 103 (1989) (advocating the
adoption of a Canadian-style health care system where all citizens would be entitled to bene-
fits as defined by a single public payer).
142. This task includes examining aspects of current health care regulation designed to
further noncompetitive goals, such as community rating laws, tax subsidies and entitlements,
for their effects on quality competition and price/quality tradeoffs.
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marketplace and clarify the role of non-market institutions. An
important point, however, is that employing a broader under-
standing of social welfare to create a balanced competition policy
does not necessarily imply that antitrust courts should incorporate
similar concerns into their internal welfare analysis. The district
court decision in Butterworth illustrates the dangers of antitrust
courts not maintaining a clear distinction between economic and
non-economic analysis.
Butterworth involved a merger of the two largest hospitals in
Grand Rapids, Michigan, which would have been presumed to be
unlawful and anticompetitive under traditional antitrust stan-
dards.143 Over the objection of the FTC, the court approved the
merger based on the hospitals' acceptance of a consent decree.
14
4
Rather than setting forth conditions under which competition
could thrive, however, the consent decree constituted a thinly
veiled effort at health care regulation through judicial mandate.
Furthermore, the court's order reflects a decidedly non-market
approach to antitrust law. For example, the court dismissed the
importance of price discounts negotiated by managed care organi-
zations, observing that such "selective price advantages are hardly
the sort of benefit the antitrust laws are designed to protect.'' 145 The
court also incorporated into the consent decree a "Commitment to
the Undeserved," representing an effort to ensure that economic
gains derived from the merger would be shared in some sense with
the broader community-whether or not they were paying cus-
tomers. 1
46
Butterworth is noteworthy because it represents a direct challenge
to contemporary antitrust understandings of total welfare and
highlights the need for a more explicit articulation of the stan-
dards that should guide antitrust decision making. In the absence
of such standards, the benefits of competition may be lost without
any commensurate gains, and the formation of health care policy
could be relegated to the whims of individual district court
judges."' Once a competition policy is established and the proper
143. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1294 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affd
without opinion 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir.), reported in full, 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,863
(6th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that the market share analysis established a prima facie case
of illegality).
144. See id. at 1303-09 (outlining terms of the consent decree).
145. Id. at 1299.
146. See id. at 1306-07.
147. Even if one is sympathetic to the views of the district court in Butterworth, defining a
workable competition policy that could effectively accomplish those aims should be done at
a broader system-wide level and not on a random market-by-market basis. It is noteworthy
that the district court opinion was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit under an abuse of discretion
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role of markets is defined (reflecting appropriate extra-economic
objectives), therefore, it may well make sense for courts to police
the functioning of such markets under a more narrowly construed
understanding of economic welfare.
IV. THE ROAD TO A COMPETITION POLICY:
A RESEARCH AGENDA
While the research agenda outlined here does not attempt to
answer all of the questions raised in this Article, it does seek to take
the initial steps towards formulating a competition policy. Our re-
search plan has four stages: first, devise a taxonomy with a clear,
systematic, vocabulary for describing the quality dimensions of
competition; second, assemble a database of quality issues that
have arisen in bealth care antitrust disputes and assess the ways in
which they have been analyzed and resolved; third, using the tax-
onomy and the results of the legal analysis, conduct structured
interviews to determine how buyers, sellers, and the antitrust en-
forcement agencies view health care quality and its role in the
competitive marketplace; and, finally, analyze the regulatory infra-
structure of health care, apart from antitrust law, with respect to its
capacity to promote quality objectives and facilitate appropriate
price/quality tradeoffs. The objective of this analysis is to identify
current features of health care regulation that impede quality
competition, examine what additional regulatory interventions
might facilitate such competition, and isolate areas where quality
competition is unlikely to be effective and where society might in-
stead choose to employ measures that reflect a nonmarket
paradigm.
A. Taxonomy of Quality Competition
Antitrust law seldom deals explicitly with quality and has never
done so in a systematic or rigorous fashion.48 In particular, anti-
trust law has only recently been called upon to assume a central
standard, the welfare standard employed not being sufficiently explicit to attract the notice
of the appellate court. See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir.), reported
inful, 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,863 (6th Cir. 1997).
148. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the price myopia of contem-
porary antitrust law).
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role in industries where quality issues are as important as they are
in health care. 149 Our first task is therefore to construct a taxonomy
for quality competition, which will be used to create a coding sys-
tem for a database of health care antitrust disputes that
incorporate quality issues, as well as to structure subsequent inter-
views with regulators, industry participants, and the public. We will
accomplish this by reviewing the legal, economic and health policy
literature, and by engaging in informal discussions with policy ex-
perts, scholars, and legal practitioners. Building this taxonomy will
require examining industries other than health care, particularly
those where substantial information asymmetries exist, where qual-
ity is an important but difficult to observe aspect of the product,
where risks exist to health and safety, or where uniform quality
standards conflict with pressures for greater horizontal differentia-
tion. These are likely to include other professional services, such as
law, accounting, and engineering; technology, such as computers,
software, and telecommunications; and common but hazardous
goods, such as automobiles.
Health services research and health policy research have devel-
oped an extensive literature on quality. 15 0 In addition, several
studies have assessed non-price competition and price/quality
tradeoffs in health care, particularly for acute care hospitals." A
few of these efforts have matched quality dimensions to competi-
tive behavior; for example, by proposing or testing the hypothesis
that hospital mergers lower costs by reducing quality competi-
tion. 5 2 However, no previous study has attempted to determine the
149. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (examining the need for antitrust law
to better address issues of quality and non-price competition in medical markets).
150. See, e.g., HAROLD S. LuFr, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: DIMENSIONS OF
PERFORMANCE 208-50 (1987) (comprehensive discussion of the different efforts to charac-
terize and measure health care quality in terms of structure, process, and outcomes based
measures); Avedis Donabedian, Quality, Cost, and Clinical Decisions, 468 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 196, 200-02 (1983) (contrasting absolutist definitions of quality with social
definitions of quality that seek to balance individual benefits with social and individual
costs); Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance Since 1980: A Litera-
ture Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512, 1516-18 (1994) (evaluating studies comparing the
performance of managed care plans and traditional indemnity plans on a variety of process
and outcomes measures of quality).
151. See FRECH, supra note 6, at 42-43 (examining evidence concerning the relationship
between economic concentration and non-price competition in hospital markets); Harold S.
Luft, et. al, Does Quality Influence Choice of Hospital?, 263 JAMA 2899, 2901-03 (1990)
(examining the role of quality-defined in terms of teaching versus non-teaching status,
referrals and transfers, and various outcomes measures-on patient choice of hospital).
152. See Barton H. Hamilton & Vivian Ho, Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions: Does
Market Consolidation Harm Patients? (1998) (working paper, John M. Olin School of Busi-
ness, Washington University) (on file with author) (finding that hospital mergers have
reduced length of stay and increased readmission rates in some cases); Hammer, Mergers,
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compatibility of quality metrics with the promotion of competition
through antitrust enforcement.
Table 1 lists potential dimensions of quality that emerge from a
brief review of the health services, economics, and antitrust litera-
ture, and represents a starting point for developing a standardized
vocabulary. Among other things, the mixture of "vertical" and
"horizontal" interpretations of quality is noteworthy.
TABLE 1
POSSIBLE ATTRIBUTES OF QUALITY COMPETITION
INSURERS/HMOs
Access to specialized care
Credentials of health professionals
Ease of plan administration
Flexibility of plan design/number of
options
Freedom of choice among
health providers
Geographic coverage
Nonprofit status/provider control
Patient information/education
Performance (process and outcome)
Range of health professions
covered
Reputation
Stability/reliability
Scope of covered benefits
Treatment of life-threatening illness
Treatment capacity
HOSPITALS/PHYSICIANS
Amenities
Compassion and trustworthiness
Credentials
Duration of treatment
Familiarity/length of relationship
Good works/provision of charity care
Location
Nonprofit status
Performance (process and outcome)
Potential for quality improvement
Reputation
Safety
Staffing intensity
Technology
The meaning of quality depends critically on who is being asked
and in what context. As Table 1 illustrates, the quality components
valued by consumers will differ with respect to their assessment of
their insurance needs versus the medical services actually received
or anticipated. Important quality dimensions for insurance include
the scope of covered benefits, the financial reliability and reserves
of the payer, freedom of choice among providers, and ease of
accessing both routine and specialized care. Quality dimensions of
hospital and physician services reflect concerns over credentials,
reputation, performance, and outcome. How these different
Market Power & Competition, supra note 116, at 161-230 (describing case studies of the
effects of hospital mergers in four different communities on various measures of price and
quality).
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aspects of quality should be assessed in isolation, and in the
context of an integrated package of health care financing and
services, presents a number of challenges.
B. Quality Issues in Health Care Antitrust Litigation
This phase of the project will identify, examine, and analyze
quality-related issues that have arisen in health care antitrust litiga-
tion. To reduce selection bias, we will locate not only disputes that
have resulted in published judicial decisions, but the larger pool of
situations in which potentially anticompetitive conduct has at-
tracted the attention of DOJ or FTC personnel. For each case, we
will determine the parties and claims, the market conduct at issue,
the evidence presented, the legal standards and arguments, and
the disposition. We will code our findings using the taxonomy and
vocabulary developed in the first phase of the project. We are in-
terested in court cases brought under the federal antitrust laws,
administrative orders issued by the FTC, and consent decrees en-
tered in formal settlement of claims from 1985 through 1999. We
are also interested in examining closing letters issued in investiga-
tions where complaints were not filed by DOJ or FTC, business
review letters issued by the two agencies, and other public docu-
ments during the same time period. We will conduct a similar, but
less comprehensive, review of the enforcement activities of state
attorneys general under state antitrust laws, which will cover the
same time period but which will be limited to formal decisions, or-
ders, and decrees available from on-line sources.
Using this process, we will compile a database of health care
antitrust disputes that involve quality concerns. Coded data will
enable us to measure the frequency and outcome of specific
quality issues, such as standardization, consumer choice,
reputation, performance, and innovation. We will also subject cases
to legal analysis to assess whether the federal enforcement agencies
and the courts are intervening when they should not, or failing to
intervene when they should, as well as how disputes and doctrines
have changed over time. For example, it may be possible to
determine the impact of the Statements of Antitrust Enforcement
Policy in Health Care issued in 1996 by DOJ and FTC, which
permit quality-driven clinical integration to substitute for financial
risk-sharing in physician networks. In combination with our
examination of the perspectives and procedures of DOJ and FTC,
case data should allow us to make qualitative observations about
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differences in approach between the enforcement agencies and
the courts and to identify institutional barriers to effective antitrust
oversight of quality competition.
C. Government, Industry, and Public Perspectives
on Quality Competition
The third segment of our research moves from theoretical and
historical constructs to current market participants and regulators.
The objectives of this part are twofold: to learn what views of qual-
ity motivate federal antitrust enforcement and actual competitive
behavior in the marketplace, and to determine whether public of-
ficials and private actors, such as health care providers and
insurers, and health care purchasers and consumers, are speaking
the same language when they assert the importance of competing
on quality. Because we will focus specifically on the relationship
between market preferences and antitrust enforcement, the details
of our method will depend to some degree on the results of the
theoretical work and case review.
We will begin by conducting structured interviews with officials,
staff attorneys, and economists at DOJ and FTC. These interviews
will help us understand how the two agencies approach issues of
quality, and will guide our subsequent assessment of actual mar-
kets. Interviews will address the agencies' (i) perspectives on the
goals of antitrust law; (ii) use of economic theory and economists;
(iii) general perceptions of health care markets; (iv) presumptions
regarding quality competition and price/quality tradeoffs; (v)
methods of selecting cases for investigation; (vi) investigative tech-
niques in specific cases; and (vii) assessment of quality-based
efficiencies in decisions to permit or challenge particular conduct.
These interviews should add considerably to existing informa-
tion about the role of antitrust enforcement in health care. To
our knowledge, there are no formal documents, public or non-
public, that guide agency investigations; rather, individual staff
attorneys and economists pursue inquiries according to current
interests and priorities. Limited studies exist of the enforcement
agencies' overall investigative methods and analytical approaches,
including an extensive review of DOJ conducted by the General
Accounting Office. 153 However, that study failed to identify
153. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GGD-91-2,JUSTICE DEPARTMENT:
CHANGES IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES 4-5 (1990) (evaluating
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non-price issues as important to any of the approximately 150
merger investigations it reviewed. 154
Our next step will be to interview buyers and sellers of health
care, focusing on large employers, insurance companies, HMOs,
hospitals, and physician groups. Since our results will be qualita-
tive, we will not attempt a random sample but will obtain the
cooperation of representative organizations. Examples of the types
of topics to be addressed are listed in Table 2. For employers, we
will talk to benefits managers, senior executives, and financial offi-
cers. For insurers, HMOs, hospitals and physician groups, we will
interview senior operational and financial management, marketing
directors, and, as appropriate, product managers, medical direc-
tors or department heads, and senior clinicians.
We will attempt to include in our sample organizations that op-
erate in multiple geographic areas, in order to determine how
their behavior and strategies vary from place to place. We will take
advantage of recent antitrust enforcement activity to discuss actual
transactions as well as hypothetical situations. To supplement the
self-reported information obtained in our interviews, we will also
attempt to assess revealed preferences regarding quality. For ex-
ample, we will perform content analysis of advertising and
marketing material, and examine publicly available information on
purchasing decisions and consumer complaints. In addition, we
will consult public use files from other databases if they contain
relevant information, such as the Community Tracking Study Phy-
sician Survey Instrument developed by the Center for Studying
Health System Change.
changes in the Antitrust Division's enforcement actions, particularly as it affects mergers,
the Division's use of economics to set enforcement policies, and the impact of budget cuts
on antitrust enforcement activities).
154. See Ginsburg, supra note 55, at 93.
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TABLE 2
TOPICS FOR MARKET INTERVIEWS
BUYERS
Definition and ranking of
quality preferences
Role of quality in decision making
Ranking of quality attributes
Price/quality tradeoffs
Tradeoffs among quality attributes
Heterogeneity of preferences
Implementation strategies for
quality objectives
Buyer characteristics
Perception of current market options
Price/search/negotiation strategies
Acceptability of substitution in market
Price sensitivity of substitution
Opinions regarding specific
seller practices
Contracting practices
Cost controls
Provider autonomy/incentives
Integration and consolidation
Joint conduct
Revealed preferences
regarding quality
Information gathering
Purchasing decisions
Monitoring practices
Consumer education efforts
Complaints and their resolution
SELLERS
Objective functions
Choice of profit/nonprofit status
Financial goals
Professional goals
Social goals
Perceptions of buyers'
priorities
Nature of negotiations
Ranking buyers' quality concerns
Estimating price/quality sensitivity
Competitive strategies
and perceptions
Geographic and product markets
Degree of product differentiation
Strategic planning
Joint conduct
Integration and consolidation
Revealed preferences
regarding quality
Organizational characteristics
Products and services offered
Cost controls and incentives
Recent organizational changes
Marketing and advertising
With respect to buyers of health care services, we are particularly
interested in their definitions of quality and their rankings of vari-
ous quality attributes. We want to better understand the role of
quality in their decision-making processes, the tradeoffs they are
willing to make between price and quality concerns, and the
strategies they employ in implementing their quality-based objec-
tives. To assess the likely pro- and anti-competitive effects of
questionable conduct, the antitrust enforcement agencies often ask
buyers their perceptions of seller behavior. In this same mode, we
will ask buyers their impressions of sellers' contracting practices,
costs controls and incentive devices, joint conduct, and integration.
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A different set of questions will be asked of sellers. Many of these
questions will attempt to shed light on the nature of the strategic
interaction occurring in health care markets. What objective func-
tion are sellers pursuing? What are sellers' financial and
professional goals? What are their perceptions of the relevant
product and geographic markets? What level and type of product
differentiation do they engage in? What are their perceptions of
buyer priorities and the role of quality concerns in buyer purchas-
ing decisions? What types of negotiation, marketing, and
advertising practices do they engage in?
End-users of medical services-individual consumers and
patients-are seldom consulted by DOJ or FTC unless they are
represented by organized advocacy groups. We plan to conduct
focus groups to obtain information about aspects of quality that
individuals consider important, 155 to compare their views to those
of their purchasing agents, and to determine if antitrust
enforcement appropriately takes their concerns into account. Who
the "buyers" are in the health care system is an important
determinant in assessing the risk of anticompetitive conduct. In
FTC's recent challenge to a hospital acquisition in Poplar Bluff,
Missouri, conflicting evidence was introduced regarding the ability
of the defendant to raise prices, depending on whether insurers or
individual patients were surveyed. 56 Focus group discussions will
also elucidate the relationship between conceptions of quality and
experience with various forms of health care financing and
delivery, as well as the effects of uncertainty and transition on
individual decision making.
D. The Regulatory Environment and Implications
for Quality Competition
Finally, we will work toward a theoretically sound, textured
model of quality competition that integrates antitrust oversight
with health care regulation. This phase of the project will require
systematic examination of a wide range of regulatory practices, par-
155. There is a growing acknowledgment of the importance of incorporating consumer
perspectives of quality in the formation of health care quality. See generally Paul D. Cleary &
Susan Edgman-Levitan, Health Care Quality: Incorporating Consumer Perspectives, 278 JAMA
1608 (1997).
156. See FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 937, 943-45 (E.D. Mo. 1998),
rev'd 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999) (describing the statistical evidence of possible price
changes).
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ticularly the policies and practices of the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA). Although HCFA is the largest purchaser
of physician and hospital services nationally, and plays a growing
role in managed care, it does not currently take positions on
health care competition or communicate views on particular prac-
tices or transactions to DOJ and FTC. HCFA has refrained from
doing so in part because its system of administrative pricing shields
it from the price effects of competitive changes. Nonetheless, the
interaction between HCFA's regulations and prevailing competitive
conditions can influence global quality, which affects Medicare and
Medicaid beneficiaries, as well as the price/quality tradeoffs avail-
able generally in the marketplace.'57 Our research should allow us
to assess the competitive implications of Medicare and Medicaid
policies and to suggest guidelines for cooperation between HCFA
and the antitrust enforcement agencies.
This last phase of our work will attempt to reach normative con-
clusions about the balance between antitrust enforcement and
substantive regulation in promoting both quality competition and
quality. We expect that our research into case law, the enforce-
ment strategies of DOJ and FTC, and industry and consumer
preferences will reveal problems with applying antitrust law to
health care quality, including doctrinal limitations, institutional
constraints affecting the legal system, and failures of the private
marketplace. For example, a conceptually coherent approach to
quality competition may require abandoning some of the simplify-
ing assumptions that currently anchor antitrust law and economics.
Our ultimate goal is a balanced competition policy which would
combine changes in antitrust doctrine with supplemental regula-
tion to facilitate the functioning of private markets, while
identifying areas where competitive markets should yield to non-
market solutions in the pursuit of quality.
CONCLUSION
Health care policy relies increasingly on private economic activ-
ity to allocate social resources within the health care sector, and
between health care and other parts of the economy. As a result,
157. See David Dranove & William D. White, Medicaid-Dependent Hospitals and Their Pa-
tients: How Have They Fared?, 33 HEALTH SERV. REs. 163, 177 (1998) (arguing that the public
good aspects of some quality dimensions mean that decisions concerning the Medicare and
Medicaid programs will have consequences for consumers of health care more generally).
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market forces are being called upon to establish the price of medi-
cal care and its quality (non-price) dimensions, to make tradeoffs
between price and quality, and to balance various quality concerns.
At the same time, there are too many social and political issues in-
volved for health care to be governed solely by the marketplace. It
is therefore necessary to construct a workable competition policy
that seeks to understand the interconnections among private mar-
kets, public values, and professional concerns. Such a policy would
seek to harmonize federal and state regulations, address distinc-
tions between public and private spheres of influence, and
reconcile the roles of government as purchaser of medical services,
guardian of public health, and protector of the integrity of private
markets through the antitrust laws.
